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Abstract 
 
 
From the time of the “war on poverty,” of 1964, to the era of “welfare reform” in 1990s, the 
federal welfare system underwent a change from a model that acted to protect citizens from the 
vagaries of the market economy to one that mandated their participation in the paid labor force.  
For a shift in policy of this magnitude to occur and be unquestioningly accepted by the public, a 
significant change also had to occur in how poverty and welfare issues were discussed and 
perceived over the intervening years. 
 
Using discourse analysis, this study examines how editorials in elite newspapers framed the 
issues of poverty and welfare in the months prior to the passage of the Economic Opportunity 
Act (1964) and the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (1996).  It 
also addresses how newspaper editorials influenced public perception about the nature and 
causes of poverty and welfare reliance. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Keywords: welfare, welfare reform, poverty, war on poverty, media, Economic Opportunity Act, 
Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act
Introduction 
 
 With the passing of the Social Security Act (SSA) in 1935, the federal government of the 
United States made its first entrée into providing for the public, and specifically economic, 
welfare of its citizens, more than six years into the devastating Great Depression.  At the time of 
the stock market crash of 1929, “the nation was equipped with the worst welfare system in the 
western world, a patchwork of voluntary institutions and pinch–penny state and local agencies” 
(Lawson 2006:9). For President Franklin D. Roosevelt, the SSA programs were intended to 
“eliminate many of the factors that cause economic depressions” and to “provide the means of 
mitigating their results” (Mink and Solinger 2003:67).  They may also be seen as a way of 
ensuring his reelection in the face of massive public support for Huey Long and his “Share Our 
Wealth” program (Piven and Cloward 1971:91).  The programs of Social Security—old age 
insurance, unemployment insurance, and aid to needy mothers with young children—were 
initially meant to provide economic security against the hazards of American life, hazards that 
resulted from a market–oriented economic system and that claimed the poor as their victims. 
 Beginning in the early 1960s, the goals of United States welfare policy changed from a 
labor protection model to a labor participation model.  Those who were experiencing poverty, 
including women with young children, were expected to assume responsibility for their 
economic situation by entering the work force.  Gone was the idea that the role of even poor 
women was to stay at home with their children, despite the cost to government.  The new 
paradigm, born of the economic crises of the time as well as a shift to a post–Fordist1 regime of 
accumulation, needed, in part, a docile, insecure, low–wage workforce, which was partly enabled 
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by the evolution of the welfare state to one that obligated its recipients to be employed in the 
private sector. 
 As these changes were taking place, political scientists, social theorists, and those in the 
media were creating ex post facto ideological justifications for the new policies.  The poor came 
to be seen as creators of their own problems and their poverty was a result of their rejection of 
the middle class American values of hard work and personal responsibility.  These economic, 
political, and ideological views were fully realized in the last major federal welfare legislation to 
date, the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996. 
 While there has been some discussion in academic literature on the media’s influence on 
public perception of poverty and welfare after the changes made to the welfare system during the 
1996 “reform” (i.e. Bullock, White, Williams 2001), there exists little literature that focuses on 
the popular media’s role before this time.  Specifically absent from the literature was a 
discussion of newspapers’ framing of the problems of poverty and welfare in response to the 
proposal of either of the two largest legislative initiatives on welfare, the Economic Opportunity 
Act, and the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996.  
Scholars recognize that, “News media play a central role in processes of symbolic power through 
which social issues are defined and solutions legitimized” (Barnett, et.al. 2007:296).  The 
mainstream media’s framing of these issues — described as “one of the primary means by which 
elite’s influence citizens’ opinions” (Druckman and Nelson 2003:730) — are attempts to 
legitimate and reinforce elite power. 
 This thesis aims to analyze how some widely read newspaper editorials constructed the 
reality of poverty and welfare in America for their readers, as well as how the construction of the 
problems and appropriate solutions in 1964 and 1996 influenced the shift in public perception 
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that occurred between those years.  A shift in goals of the magnitude that occurred between the 
EOA and PRWORA could only have occurred if the public’s perception of the poverty and 
welfare were carefully crafted by a force other than direct experience.  The media, operating 
according to Herman and Chomsky’s propaganda model (1988), based their coverage on its 
“serviceability to important domestic power interests,” allowing these major redirections in 
policy to occur with little debate or discussion that put these changes into historical context. 
In Chapters One and Two, I review the academic literature to provide a theoretical and 
historical background for this comparative study.  Chapter One traces the economic and political 
shifts that began in earnest in 1973 and which were overlooked as explanations for growing 
poverty and welfare rolls.  Additionally, I review the most popular works within an explosion of 
conservative literature from the 1980s, books that used moral arguments to justify the welfare 
state contractions that were already underway due to the slowed economic growth and inflation 
of the previous decade.  Chapter Two is a brief history of the proposed and actual changes in 
policy from Presidents Nixon through Clinton. 
Chapters Three, Four, and Five explain the method and results of a comparative discourse 
analysis of the editorials from three major newspapers—the New York Times, the Washington 
Post, and the Wall Street Journal—in the eight months leading up to the passing of the historic 
1994 and 1996 legislation.  In these chapters I examine the content and implicit assumptions of 
the editorials as a means of constructing a narrative for readers that both influenced the coming 
“personal responsibility” paradigm, in the case of 1964, or expanded its reach, as the 1996 
sample did.  The earlier pieces laid the groundwork by advancing the idea that poverty could be 
lessened by improving the situations of individuals.  When welfare programs failed to reduce 
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poverty, they were demonized and blamed for the very existence of that poverty by the 1996 
writers who advocated policy that made personal responsibility “mandatory.” 
I reviewed the sample texts looking for what was identified as the problem with poverty 
and welfare in the United States, this problem’s cause, and what the government’s ideal role 
should be in solving the problem.  The goal of this analysis was the elucidation of the framing 
devices used by the media that encouraged the public acceptance of these drastic changes to 
policy.  Following this analytic process, I concluded that the rightward political trajectory that 
the United States has been on since the 1960s, coupled with a deindustrializing and globalizing 
economy resulted in the restructuring of the federal welfare system in order to better serve the 
needs of elite capital interests.   
An onslaught of popular neoconservative literature in the 1980s, attempting to justify the 
changes underway, was, along with the mainstream media, portraying the causes of poverty and 
welfare dependence as being the failure of the poor to take responsibility for these problems 
themselves.  Readers are left with the view, constructed by the media, that the poor are poor due 
to their own bad behavior and moral failure and that the welfare system has only encouraged 
this.  By convincing the public of the truth of this image of the poor the major shifts in policy 
that turned the sixty–one–year–old federal social safety net into a state controlled mandatory 
work program were allowed to occur virtually unimpeded. 
The media 
In their study on media images of the poor in New Zealand, Barnett et.al. write,  
 
Consideration of the power of the news media is crucial because news agencies are 
primary sources of taken–for–granted frameworks for understanding social concerns, and 
are central to the definitions of social issues and the legitimization of specific approaches 
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to addressing these issues(Hodgetts, Cullen, & Radley, 2005; Tester, 2001) (Barnett, 
et.al. 2007:297). 
 
They go on, “Scholars have gone as far as to propose that news coverage is not simply a by–
product of policy initiatives but an integral part of how policy is formed and reformed,” in part 
because of policy makers view news media coverage as reflecting public opinion (297). 
 In reality, news articles and editorials are more often reflective of elite ideology and the 
desires of those with power and capital.  Edward Herman and Noam Chomsky proposed a 
propaganda model of the media, whereby it operates to inculcate the public with ideology and 
beliefs that support the power of the elite and the domination of their interests over that of the 
audience.  This is done via five “filters” that are essential to the model: the size and concentrated 
ownership and wealth of media firms, advertising as primary income, media reliance on 
government and “expert” sources, “flak” used to discipline the media, and the use of 
anticommunism as a control mechanism (Herman and Chomsky 1988).  Based on this model, 
Herman and Chomsky anticipate, “In the opinion columns . . . sharp restraints on the range of 
opinion allowed expression” (1988). 
 The opinions and “facts” that are published are carefully crafted to elicit the desired 
response from the public.  Even when the media are not explicitly telling the audience what it 
should believe, they are framing the issues in such a way that there seems to be no alternative but 
to accept their version of the truth.  Druckman and Nelson write, “Framing effects constitute one 
of the primary means by which elites influence citizens’ opinions . . . emphasis on a subset of 
potentially relevant considerations causes individuals to focus on these considerations when 
constructing their opinions” (Druckman and Nelson 2003:730).  Deconstruction and analysis of 
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media presentations of poverty and welfare are, therefore, vital in understanding both the shift in 
public opinion and the changes to policy that occurred during the late twentieth century. 
 
Discourse analysis 
 “Discourse,” writes noted linguist and critical discourse analyst Norman Fairclough, “is 
an element of social life which is dialectically interconnected with other elements, and may have 
constructive and transformative effects on other elements . . . More general processes of current 
social change often seem to be initiated and driven by changes in discourse” (Fairclough 2008).  
Critical discourse analysis, then, is more than just the study of how language is used in a text.  It 
can connect texts to the social world and can reveal evidence of their impact on larger social 
processes.  In this study, critical discourse analysis is used to understand why and how the Unites 
States has experienced a significant shift in the late twentieth century in its views on government 
obligation to the poor, the causes of poverty, and what ideal welfare policy should accomplish as 
well as how this shift was strengthened by the media’s framing of the issues. 
 Discourse analysis is one of numerous approaches to the broader methodology of content 
analysis, which Krippendorff defines as “a repertoire of methods of research that promise to 
yield inferences from all kinds of verbal, pictorial, symbolic, and communication data” 
(2004:17).   It generally focuses on the manner in which phenomena are represented in a text, 
particularly in the media (2004:17).  While discourse analysis is considered by many to be 
quantitative in nature, he questions even applying the quantitative/qualitative dichotomy to any 
content analysis as all readings of texts, even those done using computer algorithms, are 
influenced by the researcher’s “socially or culturally conditioned understandings” (2004:17).   
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 In this study, I take a qualitative approach to the analysis of newspaper editorials in an 
effort to know and understand both the explicit and implicit arguments and assumptions that 
were found in each source.  This approach involves “a close reading of relatively small amounts 
of textual matter” and a “rearticulation of given texts into new (analytical, deconstructive, 
emancipatory, or critical) narratives . . .” (Krippendorf 2004:17).  I read each text individually 
for its explicit statements and latent meanings and assumptions.  Additionally, and more 
importantly, the texts from each year’s sample were considered together as forming a narrative 
presented to the public as the comprehensive truth about poverty and welfare. 
Why the EOA and the PRWORA? 
 The Economic Opportunity Act of 1964  (EOA) and the Personal Responsibility and 
Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (PRWORA) were chosen as the subjects of this 
study because the differences between the policies encapsulate the ideologies surrounding 
poverty and government provision of welfare that were so influenced by the economic and 
political landscapes at the time of their enactment.  The differences between these two policies, 
and the arguments that were given both for and against them, reflect the vast changes that 
occurred in the media portrayal, and therefore popular perception, of the causes of poverty, the 
value of any and all work, and the need for federal government provided welfare and poverty 
assistance in the United States in the years between the war on poverty and welfare reform. 
 Both the EOA and PRWORA were signed into law by Democratic presidents during 
times of relative economic prosperity.  President Johnson noted in 1964 that the United States 
was the “richest and most fortunate nation in the history of the world” (Mink and Solinger 
2003:223).  Under President Clinton, more than 20 million jobs were created, real median 
income rose, and poverty, unemployment, and inflation were down (President William J. 
 7
Clinton: Eight Years of Peace, Progress, and Prosperity).  Additionally, the hope for both of 
these policies was the eventual employment of welfare recipients in private sector jobs.  The 
responsibility for, and method of achieving, this is what differed so vastly. 
 In introducing the EOA to the nation in his State of the Union address in January of 1964, 
Johnson repeatedly stressed the obligation of the nation as a whole, but especially the federal 
government and executive branch, to ensure the well being of all citizens.  “The Congress,” he 
said, “is charged by the Constitution to ‘provide . . . for the general welfare of the United States.’  
Our present abundance is a measure of its success in fulfilling that duty.  Now Congress is being 
asked to extend that welfare to all our people . . . this office also holds a special responsibility to 
the distressed and disinherited, the hungry and hopeless of this abundant Nation” (Mink and 
Solinger 2003:225).  In this introductory speech was recognition of the structural barriers to 
economic well being that the poor faced.  Lack of education, ill health and inadequate health 
care, and racial injustice specifically were mentioned as probable causes of poverty that needed 
remediation if the long term goal of poverty eradication was to be attained (Mink and Solinger 
2003:224).  These inequalities would require an affirmative effort on the part of the federal 
government to provide equal opportunity access to quality schooling, job training, and public 
sector service positions, as well as the involvement of the poor in creating their own plans for 
local poverty eradication via Community Action Agencies. 
 What the EOA aimed to do was to move people from poverty, and the welfare rolls, 
simply by giving them the opportunity for individual advancement.  It recognized larger 
institutionalized barriers such as racism, but its solutions focused mainly on the individual, and 
assisting the victims of poverty at personal skill enhancement in the hope that a well–educated 
poor person could move him or herself up the economic ladder.  The legislation did this by 
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attempting to “empower the poor” through the establishment of a Job Corps for high school 
drop–outs, a domestic public service corps called VISTA, and Operation Head Start which 
provided preschool education for impoverished children (Trattner 1999:322.) 
 While these initiatives were “supposed to enhance the productive ability of the needy and 
facilitate their transition from welfare to work,” (Trattner 1999:323) they were not tied to time 
limits on benefits or any requirement to work or look for work at all.  The initiation of this war 
on poverty was more the embarrassed reaction of a prosperous nation to the discovery of abject 
poverty in its midst, and not the angered reaction of a middle class to the “lazy poor” and 
“welfare cheats” that should be required to work.  These programs were offering merely the 
opportunity to be better prepared for private sector work.  Despite the ongoing debate about 
whether or not the EOA programs were effective or even fully implemented, Katz argues that 
they, “greatly extended the role and responsibilities of the federal government and altered the 
relations between citizens and the state” (1996:266).  This expansion of federal means–tested 
welfare programs, occurring prior to the economic and political shifts that began in earnest in 
1973, would be the last expansion of assistance to and programs for the “able–bodied” poor to 
date and the only major new policy of its sort to be signed until 1996. 
 Mink and Solinger claim that it was in the early 1970s, with the 1960s identified as a 
decade of liberal policy, that, “Instead of defining poverty as a quantitatively measured standard 
of need, policy experts and public opinion more often defined poverty as a measureable tax 
burden on the middle class” (2003:337)  Poverty resulted from a result of “slothfully missed 
opportunities,” not blocked opportunities (2003:337).  More than two decades later this attitude 
towards poverty inspired Clinton’s promise to “end welfare as we know it.”  PRWORA was the 
compromise between Clinton and Congress after a number of welfare reform bills were rejected 
 9
by one or the other.  Though he signed this final version into law, Clinton claimed to “strongly 
disagree with a couple of provisions,” though these contested provisions “have nothing to do 
with the fundamental purpose of welfare reform” (Mink and Solinger 2003:660).  That stated 
purpose was fourfold: to provide assistance to needy families to allow children to be cared for in 
their own homes, to end dependence on the government by promoting job preparation, work, and 
marriage, to reduce out–of–wedlock pregnancy and to encourage the maintenance of two–parent 
families (Mink and Solinger 2003:645). 
 Most importantly, the Act set forth a new relationship between the federal government, 
states and welfare recipients and officially ended the sixty-one year entitlement of any individual 
to poverty assistance benefits.  Welfare programs were from then on to be established by each 
state and would be funded by an absolute block grant and not on a shared funding plan based on 
numbers of recipients.  States were incentivized to cut rolls in order to reduce their own welfare 
expenditures.  One of the most significant new rules a state had to abide by to receive its grant 
requires all recipients to engage in “work” (as defined by the State) and limited assistance to 24 
consecutive months and 60 months over the course of a lifetime.  This federal law leaves the 
specifics of job creation and compliance with work requirements in state control.  No additional 
funds were appropriated for this purpose and states are expected to pay for these work programs 
with the money saved by reducing the number of those receiving cash assistance. 
 Both the EOA and the PRWORA are acts of legislation that profess a desire to move 
welfare recipients from government dependence into economic self–sufficiency.  Yet they do so 
in distinct ways that are indicative of the social, political, and economic milieu of their times.  In 
studying these particular pieces of legislation, and the public debate prior to their becoming law, 
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the profound ideological shift that occurred over the intervening 30 years, and the media’s role in 
furthering that shift becomes even more evident. 
 While the specific research questions and methodology for this study were formulated to 
best gather information from this particular sampling of data, the greater aim was to seek 
answers to some of the larger questions that surround the current discourse on poverty in the 
American media and, by extension, among the public.  This discourse, I theorize, led to 
Americans’ quiet acceptance of policies that fundamentally changed the purpose of the United 
States’ welfare state.  When did it become commonly accepted that many of the poor who 
receive welfare are cheating the system, are lazy, do not want to work, and have been dependent 
on government aid their entire lives?  How did the “problem of poverty” become the “problem of 
welfare”?  When and why did we begin to perceive the government’s ideal role as mandating 
participation in the paid labor force instead of providing opportunities for work and 
advancement? 
 
Endnotes 
1 Post World War II Fordism, as defined by social theorist David Harvey, should be seen less “a mere system of 
mass production and more as a total way of life.  Mass production means standardization of product as well as mass 
consumption; and that meant a whole new aesthetic and a commodification of culture . . . Fordism also built upon 
and contributed to the aesthetic of modernism — particularly the latter’s penchant for functionality and efficiency — 
in very explicit ways, while the forms of state interventionism (guided by principles of bureaucratic-technical 
rationality), and the configuration of political power that gave the system its coherence, rested on notions of a mass 
economic democracy welded together through a balance of special-interest forces” (1990:135-136).  The rigidity of 
this system made it destined to be supplanted by what Harvey terms “flexible accumulation” beginning in the early 
1970s (1990:147). 
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Chapter One: Literature Review 
 
Economic, social, and political change beginning in the 1970s 
 While the policies, rules, and specifics that guided early welfare programs were subject to 
change, and their success was not guaranteed, the stated aim of these programs was economic 
security in difficult times for families with children.  I can find little evidence of any large–scale 
popular movements that questioned the very involvement of the federal government in providing 
this security, beginning with the inception of Social Security in 1935 through at least the early 
1960s.  Gallup polls from the mid–1960s show respondents overwhelmingly favoring mandatory 
work if available (for men).  Respondents also agreed that food stamps should be given to all 
families below a certain income threshold.  Surveyors asked no questions regarding work 
requirements for women with children, or women at all (Mink and Solinger 2003:333).  Welfare 
experts of the 1940s and 1950s still stressed the need for poor (and particularly white) mothers to 
do the work of child rearing at home as a justification for the cash benefits provided by Aid to 
Dependent Children (Mink and Solinger 2003:145).   
 Literature on the welfare state, at this time and before, focused on the types of benefit 
programs offered as well as on the success and failure of these services to provide a decent 
standard of living for what was deemed the deserving poor, including those who wanted to work 
but could not, the elderly, women with young children.  There was little discussion in the post 
New Deal decades of the economic and political conditions that resulted in the need for welfare 
in the first place nor was much said about the extent of the role the federal government should 
play in its funding and delivery.  Welfare and poverty were not issues that were high on the 
national agenda or foremost in the public mind.  It was in the mid to late 1960s, about the time 
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that Lyndon Johnson’s Great Society programs were being implemented and welfare rolls and 
costs were rising, that the debate in academic literature and the popular media began to emerge 
about the goals and responsibilities of the individual and the government in welfare policy (Mead 
1986:14). 
 Typical of the type of welfare state analysis that emerged during the late 1960s and early 
1970s, June Axinn and Herman Levin (1975) focused on the role of the family as an economic 
unit as well as the structural and cultural factors that influence the creation of policy and 
programs. They identified four influential factors that are unique to a historical moment: the 
level of society’s output, the view of the effectiveness of the welfare system, the view of human 
nature, and the society’s historical heritage (1975:5).  This seems to contradict their earlier 
assertion that political decisions about welfare are purely economically based, especially in light 
of their belief that morality and ideology are resistant to change and may hold over across 
changing economic landscapes (Axinn and Levin 1975:4–5).  However, they do recognize that 
local responsibility almost always leads to a reduction in benefits, noting that “conservatism and 
restrictiveness increase as the level of government responsibility for program administration 
becomes more local” (Axinn and Levin 1975:285).   
 Axinn and Levin recognize two developing “motifs” in social welfare in the decade 
preceding 1975.  The first is the belief that the inability to pay one’s own way is a reprehensible 
crime. The second suggests that the family should be the unit responsible for economic welfare.  
Accordingly, the government should provide public welfare as a last resort.   This is notable in 
that the government’s role throughout this time was still considered to be that of the welfare 
provider in the event that the family unit failed in its duties (Axinn and Levin 1975:288).  
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Welfare was not yet so widely recognized as a vehicle for the transmission of mainstream 
cultural (capitalist) values and the enforcement of a market–oriented work ethic. 
 Recognizing this labor control function of welfare, one of the most important works on 
social welfare to be written in the pre–1973 era was Regulating the Poor: The Functions of 
Public Welfare.  In it, Frances Fox Piven and Richard Cloward posit that welfare is really a 
control mechanism, one used to stem civil and political disorder.  In contrast to Axinn and Levin, 
the authors do not see a gradual liberalization of policy and benefits through the 1960s, but a 
“record of periodically expanding and contracting relief rolls as the system performs its two main 
functions: maintaining civil order and enforcing work” (Piven and Cloward 1971:xvii).   
 This cycle of control is not dependent strictly on economic conditions, as evidenced by 
the expansion of benefits and programs both during the Great Depression as well as the relatively 
affluent 1960s.  Rather, it is related to stable employment conditions and a regular demand in 
capitalism’s requirement for labor.  Historically, mass unemployment, due to economic 
depression or rapid modernization, has broken the bond between laborers and the institutions that 
controlled them, and undermined the ability of other institutions to restrain and control.  To 
restore social order, Piven and Cloward assert, a “surrogate system of social control” took over 
for the market.  Welfare as a social control mechanism does this by offering relief to those able–
bodied citizens temporarily, before returning them to some type of work role, be it in the public 
or private sector, until control has been re–established (1971:6).   
 In the epilogue to the first edition of the book, Piven and Cloward predicted that there 
would soon be a return to the labor regulating functions of social welfare, presaged by the 
reforms being proposed at the time that required work force participation (1971:343).  They 
believed that employers would soon press for additional reforms to welfare policy that would 
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allow them to reassert their power over labor, with the support and assistance of the middle and 
lower middle classes who were resentful of the cost of relief.  According to Piven and Cloward, 
the coming tightening of relief measures would then force people off of the rolls and back into 
the labor force soon (1971:343–345).   
 While this retrenchment of relief did occur only a few years later, it was not a 
continuation of the contraction/expansion cycle that Piven and Cloward identified, but rather a 
part of a larger political, social, and cultural shift.  The movement towards ever more restrictive 
welfare policies, regardless of market fluctuations, was inevitable if, as Robert Brenner posits 
(2007), the country has been on a rightward political trajectory after the fall of liberalism and the 
replacement of the rank and file leadership of labor unions.  In his article “Structure vs. 
Conjecture: The 2006 Elections and the Rightward Shift,” Brenner links the rightward movement 
of even the Democratic Party in the United States to the emasculation of unions beginning 
shortly after passage of the SSA.  Failed postwar strikes in 1946 led to demoralized union 
members, minimal turnout in the mid–term election, and eventually the Taft–Hartley Act of 1947 
(2007:40).  The power of labor continued its decline after this.   
 But as Brenner points out, the 1960s were a paradoxical time that allowed for the increase 
in social expenditures, and a proliferation of political liberalism, despite declining union 
membership and weakened working class solidarity.  These organizations and movements were 
replaced by the civil rights movement and the attendant political demand for economic well–
being. These demands resulted in the creation of increased social welfare programs and policy, 
such as Lyndon Johnson’s Great Society legislation (Brenner 2007:41). This was all occurring, 
however, in the midst of prosperity brought about by Keynesian economic policies, which 
advocated government stimulation of the economy through reduced interest rates and increased 
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spending on infrastructure, and the large federal deficits this required.  There were massive 
welfare rights demonstrations beginning in the summer of 1966 and Piven and Cloward 
themselves devised a strategy to overload the welfare system in order to demand reform (Trattner 
1999:343–344).  This domestic unrest, and not a depressed economy, can perhaps be seen as an 
impetus for the Great Society’s expansion of social welfare programs. 
 Brenner argues that it was the economic stagnation and oil crisis of 1973, coupled with 
the backlash against Nixon after Watergate by middle and upper middle class suburbanites, 
which resulted in the election of 49 new moderate Democrats in 1974. The biggest priority for 
these newly elected legislators was reducing the government spending that had grown through 
the 1960s.  A “transformed socio–political environment” had emerged according to Brenner 
(2007:42–43).  It was “the disintegration of the labour movement, and of working class power 
more generally, that was the central factor in opening the way for the reconfiguration of politics 
under the onslaught of the corporations” (2007:44).  The rise of corporate power and the 
rightward political shift it caused, predicated by the demise of union labor, were the beginnings 
of the decrease in the real dollar amount of benefits provided under the United States federal 
welfare system.  There was, as well, a shift from its original goal of protection of families from 
the vagaries of the economy to the maintenance of a docile labor force. 
 For David Harvey, this shift in the goals of the welfare state is part of the larger move 
from Fordism, or the Fordist mode of production, to that of flexible accumulation, which itself is 
part of the rise of postmodernism.  Harvey, in The Condition of Postmodernity, suggests 19731 as 
the turning point in the regime of accumulation, and the social and political regulation that 
accompanied this change (1989:121).  Prior to that time, Fordism was the complete way of life in 
America, marked by mass production, standardization, commodification of culture, and a new 
 16
aesthetic based on functionality and efficiency.  In turn, the Fordist paradigm offered job 
security, as well as wages that could support a family and were tied to the growth of national 
productivity.  Harvey asserts that Fordism, as imagined by Henry Ford, recognized that, “mass 
production meant mass consumption, a new system of the reproduction of labour power, a new 
politics of labour control and management, a new aesthetics and psychology, in short, a new kind 
of rationalized, modernist, and populist democratic society” (1990:126–127). 
 Those who were excluded from the high–wage and secure Fordist jobs found in 
manufacturing and industry, (e.g. women and minorities), had become discontent.   Towards the 
end of the reign of Fordism, counter–cultural, social and political movements were beginning to 
take hold.  By this time, Harvey argues, “the legitimation of state power depended on the ability 
to spread the benefits of Fordism over all and to find ways to deliver adequate health care, 
housing, and educational services on a massive scale but in a humane and caring way . . . in the 
end it was probably the quantitative failure that provoked the most serious dilemmas” 
(1990:139).  Government’s ability to supply these services was based on the “continuous 
acceleration in the productivity of labour in the corporate sector” (Harvey 1989:139). 
 It was in the late 1960s and early 1970s when the rigidity of Fordism — which was tied 
to the manufacturing of goods and Keynesianism’s federal deficit spending — was countered by 
newly liberal monetary policy that led to rising inflation.  The recession that followed, and the 
concurrent oil crisis, “set in motion a whole set of processes that undermined the Fordist 
enterprise.”  The 1970s and 1980s were consequently a time of political and social restructuring 
that Harvey believes may be the start of an entirely new regime of accumulation (Harvey 
1989:145). 
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 So what did this change mean for the welfare state?  Since the Fordist political consensus 
was that entitlements and income redistribution should be funded out of growth, and growth had 
slackened off, cuts in state expenditures for public welfare were inevitable.  Necessary cuts to the 
welfare state during the crisis of 1973 to 1975 then became a permanent governmental virtue 
propagated by “neoconservatives.”   Proponents of this emerging ideology were defined by its 
“godfather” Irving Kristol as believing in not only a libertarian economic policy focused on 
cutting taxes in pursuit of economic growth, but being concerned with what he terms a “decline 
in democratic culture” (2003).  The popular image of government’s ideal role that 
neoconservatives cultivated was of “strong governments administering powerful doses of 
unpalatable medicine to restore the health of ailing economies” (Harvey 1989:168).  As these 
neoconservatives were arguing for the reduction of benefits and cutting taxes, they were 
lamenting the “crisis of democracy” that was a result of a social structure where wealth and 
learning were concentrated among a small percentage of the population.  For them, this was not a 
problem of social inequality but one of a prevailing sentiment among academics and intellectuals 
who devalued capitalism and the current leadership and valued private satisfaction instead of the 
“materialistic work-oriented, public spirited values” of earlier times (Crozier 1975:5–7). 
 These political changes did not occur in a social and cultural vacuum.  Flexible capital 
accumulation (Harvey 1990:147), and the move away from the Fordist mode of production, 
made collective action more difficult.  Competitive individualism became the hegemonic value.  
Harvey (1989:172) references Georg Simmel’s assertion that times of fragmentation and 
economic insecurity see a return to basic institutions and the authority of the family, state, and 
religion. With this in mind, the rise of the neoconservatives in the political arena, and the 
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popularity of individualist ideologies that exploded in the 1980s make sense in the reality of the 
postmodernist environment. 
 Marxist James O’Connor, writing The Fiscal Crisis of the State just prior to Harvey’s 
watershed year of 1973, argues that the existence of the welfare state is essential for capital 
accumulation.  While the state and the private sector can both grow at the same time and neither 
grows at the other’s expense, crisis occurs because there is inevitably a gap between state 
expenditures and state revenues.  Essentially, for O’Connor, capital accumulation results in costs 
and those costs are increasingly socialized.  Yet the profits—social capital—are appropriated 
privately.  This structural contradiction, also evident in the state’s obligation to both provide an 
environment amenable to accumulation as well as to legitimate itself by creating the conditions 
for social harmony, O’Connor terms “the fiscal crisis of the state” (1973:6–10).  Wealth 
accumulation leads to increased inequality and associated government costs, as well as decreased 
revenue to compensate for these rising costs.   
 O’Connor attributes some of the state’s problems to the erosion of federalism, though in 
retrospect, it has been federalism in the realm of public welfare, as well as federal deregulation 
of business, that has allowed the modern corporatist government to thrive and per capita social 
welfare expenditures to fall.  He writes, “There has been a gradual erosion of the traditional 
federal system in the United States.  Monopoly capitalist groups and the federal executive have 
been working together to increase federal power in local affairs and, step–by–step, to dismantle 
local government” (O’Connor 1973:90).  One example of this increasing control is the federal 
establishment of guidelines for grant–in–aid packages to states (O’Connor 1973:90).  It is now 
evident that the removal of those guidelines, as well as the establishment of block grants, proved 
detrimental to those dependent on federal welfare programs.  It also freed up additional federal 
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funds to be used elsewhere.  As Axinn and Levin have noted, greater local control results in 
increasingly conservative eligibility standards and benefit levels (1975:285). 
 O’Connor identifies two purposes to the modern welfare state, both contradictory to its 
stated goal of protection from economic downturns.  The welfare system, as it existed in the late 
1960s and early 1970s, had to exist because of the imbalances of capitalism.  It was created to 
control surplus labor, as well as to increase demand for goods and services, and to expand 
domestic markets.  O’Connor argues that state budgets redistribute income backwards and 
forwards within the working class in an effort to maintain harmony, expand productivity, and 
increase accumulation and profits (1973:167). 
 The problems arise, however, when the rapid accumulation of capital results in the need 
for increased welfare expenditures as more of the costs of this accumulation are socialized.  
O’Connor believes that lawmakers eventually realized that poverty is inherent in a capitalist 
system and that economic growth alone cannot eliminate this contradiction.  Governments tried 
to escape this problem by devising the first welfare programs that encouraged recipients to return 
to the work force by providing in–kind benefits like day care centers and job training and also by 
attempting to reform the behavior of the poor whom they believed did not share in the middle 
class work ethic.   
 According to O’Connor, these methods of social control would not be reduced — and 
political and social control returned to normal — with an upswing of the economy (Piven and 
Cloward 1971).  It is capital growth and monopolistic accumulation itself that is a source of 
poverty (Gilbert 2002:11). As long as this contradiction persists, government welfare 
expenditures will struggle to keep up with need.  Tactics of increasing control of labor and 
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forced market participation, as well as rampant corporate welfare, will prevail.  For O’Connor, 
the only solution to this crisis is a complete abandonment of capitalism in favor of socialism. 
 This earlier discussion of a crisis in the welfare state by both O’Connor and others is 
identified by Neil Gilbert as “not signaling an impending bankruptcy so much as a turning 
point—a change of course in response to new problems and values” (2004:44) evident in the 
change in literature on the welfare state that emerged in the 1980s and 1990s.  Abandoning the 
concept of a crisis, researchers and theorists focused on new arrangements for social protection 
(Gilbert 2002:44).  The change Gilbert outlines in Transformation of the Welfare State: The 
Silent Surrender of Public Responsibility is based on four shifting characteristics of the welfare 
state in modern times and is representative of a paradigm shift that he believes has been 
minimized by policy makers.   
 These changes are evidence of a more market–oriented approach to social welfare 
(Gilbert 2002:45–46).  Gilbert terms this the emerging “enabling state,” which shifts 
responsibility for the provision of services from public agencies to private agencies, with funds 
increasingly spent on indirect costs.  Universal entitlement, evident in programs like Social 
Security that minimize stigma, is abandoned for selective eligibility—targeting certain minority 
groups as beneficiaries of programs—which attempts to restore social equity but has the 
downside of stigmatizing recipients and making the programs politically unpalatable.    
 Most importantly, for this discussion, is the move towards policies that coerce labor force 
participation, instead of protecting labor from harsh free market conditions, a shift that reached 
its apex with the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 
(PRWORA).  Entitlement to social and economic support, regardless of behavioral constraints, 
works to decommodify labor, making it not purely responsive to market forces.  However, the 
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newly “heightened emphasis on employment–related measures in the enabling state has been 
accompanied by the development of social provisions aimed to enhance human capital and help 
the unemployed adjust to modern labor market requirements,” according to Gilbert (2002:46).  
These provisions might better be seen not as helping the unemployed to adjust to market 
conditions but as providing the market a labor force with few alternatives but to accept the 
conditions of employment it is given. 
 These shifts in policy and ideology result in a loosening of the social cohesion that arises 
from the existence of (and public discussion about) our shared rights as citizens.  The prior 
concentration of the public discourse on rights is replaced by a demand for individual 
responsibility, civic duty and an increase in importance on supposedly shared values (Gilbert 
2002:46).  Gilbert offers a sociological explanation of these events, seeing the enabling state as 
shifting the method of social cohesion from the realm of citizenship to the realm of Durkheimian 
membership in secondary groups that take the place of the state in promoting social life 
(2002:46).  But more important to the concept of the welfare/enabling state, which Gilbert does 
not address here, are the “shared values” that are so often linked to the promotion of economic 
personal responsibility and the importance of hard work within the capitalist labor force.  Those 
who reject these values risk losing membership in wider societal networks along with the 
political and economic benefits and opportunities that come with this membership. 
 Gilbert’s paradigm shift entails not just the changing of welfare state policies but an 
entire movement to the right, where politically left-leaning and liberal politicians now carry 
through the policies earlier demanded by conservatives, as Brenner also argued (2007).  Even in 
the midst of drastic changes to the goals, policies, and practices of welfare state mechanisms, 
these leaders deny this reorientation, framing it as simply “beneficial adjustments” (Gilbert 
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2002:179).  Gilbert advises that before any actually beneficial and protection–oriented welfare 
policy can be created, there must be recognition of this paradigm shift, born of O’Connor’s fiscal 
crisis of the state, the fall of Fordism, and the concomitant abandonment of public responsibility 
for the poor that began in the 1970s. 
The popular ideological shift of the 1980s and early 1990s 
 While politicians began to radically redirect the welfare state from its earlier (stated) goal 
of social protection to that of social control and obligatory labor force participation during the 
crisis of the 1970s, their argument that this shift in goals was a necessary evil and good for the 
nation (Harvey 1989:168) seemed to be internalized by the public.  It was manifested in the 
election of Ronald Reagan in 1980 and in the growing popularity of conservative ideology 
among voters.  Throughout the 1980s and early 1990s there were a series of influential and 
widely read books (Murray 1984, Auletta 1982, Mead 1986) that used varying arguments to 
arrive at the same conclusion, that the welfare state of the prior fifty years had resulted in 
dependence, a loss of work ethic, and increased poverty.  Welfare policy thus needed to be 
fundamentally changed, if not abandoned altogether.  Though this was not the first argument for 
welfare state diminishment (e.g. Rescher 1972), it was certainly the most widely received.   
 Leading the popular charge for the complete abandonment of any federal welfare system 
was political scientist Charles Murray.  In Losing Ground, he argued that poverty relief programs 
were, by design, harmful to the poor and that they encouraged the poor to behave in ways that 
kept them in poverty.  Since this knot cannot be untied, Murray suggests cutting the rope 
altogether, and ending all entitlement programs for all working-aged people and their underaged 
dependents (1984:228).   
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 Murray, seemingly ignoring the civil rights and welfare rights movements of the 1960s, 
claims that the creation of the war on poverty programs and the “paradigm shift” that occurred 
between 1964 and 1967 was an adoption of the beliefs of the intelligentsia, and neither indicative 
of a shift in public ideology nor a result of popular movements for economic equality (1984:41–
43).  Accordingly, the elite belief that the economy and educational system were to blame, as 
well as what he saw as an agreement by Great Society policy makers that there was a need for an 
equality of outcome and not just opportunity, represent for Murray a sea change in welfare policy 
that served only to harm those it was designed to help. 
 Murray reviews a number of statistics on employment, education, crime, poverty, and 
family composition.  He concludes that, as welfare spending increased, social indicators pointed 
to a worsening situation for the poor.  This increase in spending and decrease in effectiveness, he 
believes, is because social policy since 1964 had ignored the perspectives of “white popular 
wisdom” that could be heard in “blue–collar bars” and “country–club lounges.”  This popular 
wisdom, Murray writes, is, “when stripped of its prejudices and bombast,” based on three 
premises: (1) people respond to incentives and disincentives; (2) people are not inherently hard 
working or moral; and (3) people must be held responsible for their actions.  He deems it simple 
to “strip away” the racism inherent in this popular wisdom without further discussion.  He 
accuses social analysts of rejecting these premises because they are too simple to be true, and not 
because they reflect racist and classist prejudices (1984:146).  
 These social programs — formulated by elites and following the elite wisdom on the 
causes of and solutions to poverty — brought about failure of the poor to conform to middle 
class values.  First, Murray argues, increased eligibility and benefit levels cause the poor to 
choose the short term monetary gain of welfare and life as a single parent over behaviors like 
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low–wage work and marriage, which are strategies he believes to be beneficial in the long term.  
These incentives not to work in the short term injured those who chose difficult and low paying 
jobs over the security of welfare.  Thus, welfare eroded the traditional system of rewards and 
punishments/ incentives and disincentives in choosing or not choosing to work (Murray 
1984:177).    
 Next, Murray suggests that the “system is to blame” argument is in fact itself to blame for 
the “homogenization of the poor” and the diminishment of the deserving/undeserving distinction 
(1984:178–191).  He argues that status was “withdrawn from the low-income, independent 
working family, with disastrous consequences to the quality of life of such families,” and 
“withdrawn from the behaviors that engender escape from poverty” (Murray 1984:179).  
Essentially, he says that without external status rewards for hard work and upward mobility, and 
regardless of the presence of material rewards, the poor have no incentive to work towards 
getting themselves out of poverty. 
 Implicit in Murray’s argument are a number of assumptions, including the belief that 
marriage and work are simply a matter of choice for the poor, and not a decision hinged on 
complex life circumstances.  Additionally, as the “popular wisdom” states, he relies on the belief 
that people are inherently lazy and immoral and will assume the path of minimal work despite 
the accompanying minimal rewards.  Murray’s reliance on the concept of poverty and welfare 
reliance as an alternative to hard work, as a personal choice, necessarily led first to the call for 
personal responsibility for economic well–being and next to the end of programs that only 
encourage people to choose poverty and government dependence. 
 While Murray’s welfare policy recommendation of abolishing all federal welfare was 
extreme and unlikely to be adopted, he was only the most conservative of many voices rejecting 
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systemic explanations for poverty in favor of theories that focused on the behavior of the poor 
within the current welfare system.  Lawrence Mead objected not to the welfare state’s size, but to 
the lack of obligations it established on the part of recipients.  Only a few years after the release 
of Murray’s tome, Mead’s Beyond Entitlement (1986) offered another ideological critique of 
recent policy.  It furthered the argument for a welfare overhaul to reverse the paradigm shift 
Murray identified as occurring between 1964 and 1967.  To summarize his argument, Mead 
wrote,  
 
 
I think the main problem with the welfare state is its permissiveness, not its size.  Today 
poverty often arises from the functioning problems of the poor themselves, especially 
difficulties in getting through school, working, and keeping their families together.  But 
the social programs that support the needy rarely set standards for them.  Recipients 
seldom have to work or otherwise function in return for support.  If they did, the evidence 
suggests that they would function better, bringing closer an integrated society (1986:ix). 
 
For welfare programs to work, according to Mead, there needs to be a balance between the 
benefits given and the duties of benefit recipients to maintain standards of behavior that non 
welfare recipients are held to.  Mead believes that those who depended on the government for 
assistance were shielded and able to “get away with” behavior that would be unacceptable for 
someone of the middle class. 
 Central to Mead’s argument is his belief that the role of the government is to maintain 
Hobbesian order, that is, the “public conditions for the private assurance of what Jefferson called 
‘life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness’” (1986:5).  This means managing economic 
conditions and assuring equal economic opportunity to all, not simply maintaining public order 
or providing public services.  But this order cannot be provided by government alone.  It is 
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simply a “mechanism by which people force themselves to serve and obey each other in 
necessary ways” (Mead 1986:6). 
 In Mead’s argument, we see the call both for individual economic responsibility and for 
governmental behavior requirements and restrictions.  Poverty, he believes, was not just the 
result of too little income, but of the non work or irregular work of the poor.  He claims that this 
is especially true of welfare recipients who “seldom worked” (1986:91).  If Mead is correct, it 
follows then that obligatory participation in the labor force would end the poverty problem. 
 Why would the poor, or anyone, voluntarily choose not to work?  Unemployment, he 
thinks, is not due to the lack of jobs.  Rather it is the lack of availability of satisfactory jobs with 
rewarding pay and good conditions, as well as the presence of alternative sources of income, 
namely, government redistribution programs.  Mead also locates part of this trend of non work in 
the cultural values of the poor.  He claims that while the poor may say that they want to work, 
they are either only telling the researcher want they think he or she wants to hear, or their desire 
to work is highly conditional and dependent on government provision of child care, training 
programs, transportation, and acceptable positions (1986:80). 
 These able-bodied yet non working poor people, with values so different from the 
mainstream, are part of what became known popularly in the 1980s as “the underclass.”   Ken 
Auletta’s book, titled The Underclass (1982), purports to give a “first hand account of America’s 
new social dropouts — street criminals, hustlers, long–term welfare recipients and the homeless 
— and of what might be done to bring them into the mainstream.”  The image of the deserving 
poor — white, intact families whose breadwinner had lost his job due to circumstances beyond 
his control — had been nearly universally abandoned in the popular media and by academics that 
came to influence welfare policy through the mid-1990s.  The welfare fraud thesis — the belief 
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that many were cheating the system and living the high life at taxpayer expense — that 
O’Connor claims was discredited in the 1960s (1973:165) reappeared with renewed strength. 
 Auletta’s “first–hand account” was written after he embedded himself into a group of 
trainees in a work program for members of the “underclass” with particularly acute “behavioral 
and income deficiencies.”  What is important about the book is neither the study of the efficacy 
of the work program nor the policy suggestions Auletta makes.   Rather, it is the unquestioned 
acceptance of the existence of an underclass, trapped by their own culture of poverty.  By the 
time of the publication of The Underclass, Auletta believed that there was “broad agreement that 
America [had] developed an underclass” (1982:50).  Characterized differently by the right and 
the left — either as pathology, passivity, and hostility, or as alienation, hopelessness, and despair 
(1982:50) — underclass values were projected onto millions of the poor who were now 
popularly viewed as distinctively the “other,” needing behavior and value modification and not 
just equal economic opportunity and income assistance.  A second paradigm shift, counter to the 
one Murray identifies in the 1960s, could be said to have occurred in the popular perception of 
poverty in America in the 1980s. 
 This is not to say that there were no differing or alternative views on the subject.  Two 
books by famous sociologists countered the conservative arguments for the very existence of a 
culture of poverty and an underclass, and for the end to welfare entitlements.  In Herbert Gans’ 
The War Against the Poor (1996), he posits that the labeling of the poor as members of an 
undeserving underclass has allowed the nation to more easily wage “war” against them using 
punitive policy measures.  The ideological assault on the poor was an ex post facto justification 
for the changes to the welfare state that had begun following the economic and cultural shift 
beginning in 1973. 
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 Gans locates the start of the popular use of the term “underclass”—used to refer 
specifically to both black poverty and poverty with a negative behavioral aspect—to a cover 
story in the August 29, 1977 issue of Time Magazine.  In it, the members of the underclass were 
referred to as “victims and victimizers in the culture of the street hustle” (1996:31).  But it was 
Auletta’s use that was the “last stage in the label–making process,” making the term officially 
one that referred to the “behavioral deficiencies” of a diverse group including the mentally ill, 
the homeless, drug addicts, former drug addicts, welfare recipients, and criminals (Gans 
1996:33–35).  
 Gans believes that the use of this label creates distance between the poor and the rest of 
society, allowing for the accommodation of normally taboo racist beliefs and other prejudices.  
He sees a harmful process occurring whereby the term “underclass” is reified and its definition is 
transformed into an actual set of people with its imaginary roots forgotten.  From there, the 
“underclass” can become a causal mechanism.  According to Gans, being a member of the 
underclass can be used as an explanation for why someone becomes homeless, gets addicted to 
drugs, or commits a crime (1996:61). 
 This labeling leads to the determination of the “undeservingness” of the poor, which 
further leads to actions and policies that worsen their plight but are supposedly of benefit to the 
rest of society.  Of the thirteen functions that Gans believes this process of labeling serves, two 
are most relevant to this discussion.  First is the shift in power to conservative politicians and 
interests.  If the poor are undeserving, and it is the liberal Left who speak on their behalf, 
conservatives can attack such leftist positions as favoring criminals and miscreants.  The polity 
“as a whole can . . . shift to the right.”  Gans notes that it was this function of undeservingness 
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that Murray called upon when suggesting that welfare be abolished because it only resulted in 
increased poverty (1996:99). 
 Next, Gans argues that the “undeservingness” label functions to push the poor out of the 
labor force completely, thereby reducing the formal unemployment rate and also conserving jobs 
for the deserving poor and the non poor.  This is accomplished via legislation and the informal 
labeling of the poor as unable to learn skills and as having a culture that leads them to avoid 
work.  Gans goes so far as to suggest the end result could be the complete elimination of surplus 
labor due to early death from a decreased standard of living (1996:101).  
This belief that the poor could essentially die out, taking surplus labor with them, could 
be construed as contradicting the theory of welfare as a means of forcing the poor back into the 
work force.  However, the two could work in concert.  By forcing the poor out of the labor force 
initially, making them desperate enough to seek welfare, they can be made to re–enter the 
workforce on more exploitative terms.  While this may be the case, Gans still proposes a 
comprehensive job–centered policy initiative aimed at bringing the poor back into the 
mainstream.  Reminiscent of Mead’s argument,  Gans suggests that once the poor are working 
and entitled to the rights that mainstream societal membership includes, they will “be more likely 
to accept the responsibilities that come with these rights” (1996:108).  While Gans has railed 
against the labeling of the poor as an underclass with behavioral deficiencies, he has ascribed 
these negative characteristics to them himself in assuming that they do not already, as a group, 
accept their responsibilities as citizens.  Despite this contradiction, The War Against the Poor 
offers an important dissenting voice in the debate over the perceived antisocial behavior of the 
“underclass,” “the welfare queens,” and those trapped in the “culture of poverty.” 
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 One of the major principles of Gans’ proposed policy was its universality, a concept that 
was also given voice by William Julius Wilson nearly a decade earlier.  Yet, unlike Gans, Wilson 
was not averse to using terms like “underclass” to label the poor.  He believed that,  
 
 . . . it would be far worse to obscure the profound changes in the class structure and 
social behavior of ghetto neighborhoods by avoiding the use of the term underclass.  
Indeed, the real challenge is to describe and explain these developments accurately so 
that liberal policymakers can appropriately address them (1987:8). 
 
Wilson readily admits that the behavior and the life choices of the poor have changed since the 
1950s — essentially that an underclass characterized by nonmainstream behavior does exist — 
but he attacks the conservative argument that the rise in crime, joblessness, and single–parent 
households are a result of liberal welfare policies that resulted in the poor’s abandonment of 
mainstream values.  Rather, it is social isolation, and the “concentration effects” of living an 
isolated life in the ghetto, not a culture of poverty, that makes it more difficult to live life 
according to the rules of mainstream society (1987:60). Wilson identifies these concentration 
effects as: 
 
 . . .the constraints and opportunities in neighborhoods in which the population is 
overwhelmingly socially disadvantaged—constraints and opportunities that include the 
kinds of ecological niches that the residents of these neighborhoods occupy in terms of 
access to jobs and job networks, availability of marriageable partners, involvement in 
quality schools, and exposure to conventional role models (1987:61). 
 
While conditions in the ghetto due to concentration effects are not the result of a “culture of 
poverty” for Wilson, cultural traits there have changed in response to structural constraints.  
Therefore, policy should be oriented towards changing these structural conditions that lead to 
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negative cultural traits and not towards punitive measures designed to modify the behavior of the 
poor (1987:61). 
 To correct these problems, Wilson advocates a comprehensive and universal program of 
complete economic and social reform.  While there would still be some means tested and 
affirmative action programs, these would be merely offshoots of a larger system where all 
citizens are entitled to benefits.  Wilson believed that if those other than the poor were also the 
beneficiaries of these government programs, they would assure their funding and continued 
existence, just as we have seen with the defense of Social Security by even those who are 
opposed to programs targeted to poor mothers and children.  According to Wilson, economic 
stagnation and joblessness must be addressed at a macroeconomic national level, in addition to 
the provision of cash allowances and job training programs, for widespread poverty eradication 
to become a reality (1987:157).  
 The more liberal views on poverty and welfare of both Wilson and Gans (though 
definitely farther right of the “liberal” positions of the 1960s) were certainly in the minority 
through the 1980s and 1990s.  Conservatism, and conservative politicians and thinkers, 
dominated politics and public discourse during this period.  Beginning with the inauguration of 
Ronald Reagan in 1981, and culminating with the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity 
Reconciliation Act in 1996 under Bill Clinton, welfare policy became increasingly punitive and 
work oriented in response to a changing perception of the poor as being the cause of their own 
poverty. 
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Endnotes 
1 Harvey writes, “The breakdown in 1971 of the Bretton Woods agreement to fix the price of gold and the 
convertibility of the dollar was an acknowledgment that the United States no longer had the power to control fiscal 
and monetary policy single-handedly.  The adoption of a flexible exchange rate system in 1973 . . . signaled the 
complete abolition of Bretton Woods.  Since that time all nation states have been at the mercy of financial 
disciplining . . . “ (1990:164-165). 
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Chapter Two: Changes in Modern Welfare Policy 
 
Welfare policy through the 1970s and 1980s 
 One of the largest expansions to the federal welfare state occurred under conservative 
President Richard Nixon, just as stagflation was taking hold and unemployment was rising.  In 
the fall of 1972, the nation adopted the Supplemental Security Income Program (SSI), which 
guaranteed income for aged, blind, and totally and permanently disabled.  It also established 
uniform federal eligibility and benefit requirements.  This was the nation’s first guaranteed 
annual income program (Trattner 1999:348).  Yet this expansion of entitlement was intended 
strictly for the “deserving” poor, those unable to work (and not simply unwilling) according to 
the standards of the federal government.  By contrast, Nixon’s proposal for a guaranteed income 
for families with children, including those families with able–bodied males in the household, 
never made it past Congress.  By the time of Nixon’s resignation during the Watergate scandal, 
and because of that scandal, Walter Trattner suggests that even liberals “began to question 
sharply the ability of elected officials to govern fairly and to control the course of events, 
especially in a humane and rational way, and to urge that government involvement in social 
programs be curtailed” (1999:351). 
 This distrust of national leadership persisted through the administration of Jimmy Carter.  
Trattner argues that this is why Carter’s proposal for a complete overhaul of the welfare system 
was allowed to expire by Congress before coming to a vote.  The Better Jobs and Income 
Program, a two–tiered system to guarantee jobs for those who could work and income for those 
who could not, as well as a guaranteed minimum income for all, languished in Congress without 
 34
ever being voted on (Trattner 1999:355–356).  This was just one of Carter’s plans, including a 
national health care program, which he was unable to get Congress to approve.  
 While this could be seen as a manifestation of his lame–duck status, intensified by the 
high rate of inflation and the Iranian hostage crisis, which eventually played itself out with 
Ronald Reagan’s landslide victory of 1980 (Trattner 1999:358), Michael Katz sees both Carter 
and Nixon’s failures as mainly ideologically based.  Because both of their plans did not make 
benefits totally contingent on the recipients’ willingness to work, they were “threatening to aid 
the unworthy poor and breaching the distinction between public assistance and social insurance; 
[both the Nixon and Carter plans] violated the structural foundations of American welfare” 
(1996:278). 
 Reagan interpreted his election as a mandate to enact policies that began the dismantling 
of the welfare state.  Influenced by advisers who argued either that the war on poverty had 
already been won, or that the poor actually needed poverty to spur them to work (Trattner 
1999:363), Reagan set about rolling back the programs begun during Roosevelt’s New Deal.  He 
drastically and quickly slashed billions of dollars from the budgets of social welfare programs.  
This was not to reduce the size of the government, but to divert those funds to defense spending 
instead.  Katz writes: 
 
By 1983, under complex new regulations, 408,000 people had lost their eligibility for 
AFDC and 299,000 had lost their benefits.  The average loss of benefits per family was 
$1,555 per year . . . Other regulations restricted eligibility for food stamps and cut $2 
billion out of the programs $12 billion budget . . . Extended unemployment insurance 
benefits were cut back—in 1975 ‘78 percent of jobless Americans received 
unemployment insurance benefit’ compared to 39 percent at the end of 1983 (1996:296). 
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It is estimated that a total $57 billion was cut from federal welfare programs that benefited the 
poor from 1982 to 1986 (Stoesz and Karger 1990:145).  During the Reagan administration, 
decreases to benefits were not made simply out of a reluctance to raise benefits in the face of 
inflation or the general decrease in purchasing power across the nation.  Rather, they were cuts 
intended to roll back what was left of the welfare state (Katz 1996:297). 
 For most of his two terms, Reagan continued his dedication to the conservative values of 
individualism and personal economic responsibility while simultaneously expanding the size of 
government in areas like defense.  He did this while ignoring or discounting the poverty problem 
and blaming any existing poverty on the unwillingness of the poor to work themselves into the 
economic mainstream.  Additionally, in his 1982 State of the Union address, he called for a 
“New Federalism” along with state control and complete funding of both AFDC and food 
stamps, allowing localities to make cut backs as they deemed necessary (Trattner 1999:365).  
States responded by initiating “workfare” programs as a means of alleviating the strain of public 
welfare on their already strapped budgets. 
 Despite Reagan’s belief that the poor needed less welfare to get out of poverty, and likely 
because of it, conditions worsened.  Congress reacted by passing the Family Support Act (FSA), 
the only major programmatic change to welfare in the 1980s, which promised to make United 
States welfare an employment system and not a payment system.  The most important aspect of 
the new program was its requirement that single parents on welfare be required to work in order 
to receive benefits.  Those who could not find employment in the private sector were made to 
enroll in education or job training programs.  States were required to meet quotas for enrollment 
in training programs.  If they failed to comply, their grants would be reduced (Trattner 
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1999:376).  State administered workfare was now a requirement for receipt of federal funds, and 
the first steps towards the punitive PRWORA had been taken.   
 The administration of George H. W. Bush in 1988 did little to address the problem of 
poverty.  Concerned with the overthrow of Noriega and the war in Iraq, there was a marked 
absence of welfare legislation during his time in office.  The 1980s had ended, and the 1990s 
began, with the continued operation of the welfare system under the regulations created by the 
FSA.  But there was a new consensus about a new workfare that required mutual obligation.  The 
state was required to provide benefits and in turn, the recipient was required to participate in the 
states work programs in order to transition from welfare to private sector employment (Katz 
1996:306).  Welfare could no longer be considered protection from the ups and downs of the 
labor market.  It now functioned to force people into the private labor force simply to be eligible 
for benefits. 
Dashed hopes for progressive change 
 Just as they reacted to the political impotence of Carter by electing Reagan in 1980, 
American voters then elected Bill Clinton in 1992 as a statement of their increased concern with 
worsening economic indicators and other domestic issues such as welfare and health care.  
Clinton, unlike Bush before him, inspired “great optimism that [he] would make good on his 
promises to change the way things worked in Washington and to be President to all of the 
American people” (Trattner 1999:392).  His election seemed to herald great changes, especially 
to the welfare system, of which he proposed setting time limits on received benefits (Trattner 
1999:390).  Though Clinton attempted to hold the centrist line in order to get elected by 
suggesting these tweaks to the system, policy experts were suggesting a complete rethinking of 
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how the welfare system should actually operate, as well a total overhaul of government attitude 
towards social welfare and its policy to provide for it. 
 Gosta Esping–Andersen advised looking at the social welfare problem from a regime 
standpoint—the welfare state cannot be understood as simply a totality of government 
amelioration programs and income transfers but must consider the interaction of governments 
and their policy, labor markets, and households that encompass the regime (1990:1–2, 21).  
According to Esping-Andersen, these regimes are clustered into three types.  The Social 
Democratic regimes have extended benefits to the middle class and have pursued a high level of 
equality, and not a policy of the provision for minimal needs.  Corporatist regimes aim to 
maintain status and class distinctions, and their policies were often tied to the Church, yet there is 
little debate as to the state’s proper role in providing benefits. 
 The United States falls into the third category of the schema, with a liberal welfare state,  
 
. . . in which means–tested assistance, modest universal transfers, or modest social 
insurance plans predominate.  Benefits cater mainly to a clientele of low–income, usually 
working class, state dependents.  In this model, the progress of social reform has been 
severely circumscribed by traditional, liberal work–ethic norms: it is one where the limits 
of welfare equal the marginal propensity for welfare instead of work.  Entitlement rules 
are therefore strict and often associated with stigma; benefits are typically modest.  In 
turn, the state encourages the market, either passively — by guaranteeing only a 
minimum — or actively — by subsidizing private welfare schemes (Esping–Andersen 
1990:26–27). 
 
Esping–Andersen sees these categories, and the historical forces behind them, as being vital in 
understanding why welfare states operate the way that they do and what their future prospects 
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are.  What is possible, and what is likely, to occur in United States welfare policy is dictated by 
its regime type, which depends on a numeric and economic minority for support (1990:33). 
 If this is the case, welfare programs that directly benefit the majority of Americans would 
be the only ones to achieve majority public support in the political environment of the late 
twentieth century.  This was evident in the “political storm” that followed Reagan’s suggested 
cuts to Social Security (Trattner 1999:366) and in President George W. Bush’s failure to find the 
public and legislative support to privatize the program.  As with William Julius Wilson before 
her, policy expert Theda Skocpol also advocated a universal approach, within which there would 
be targeted programs for the poor.  This would be part of a total redesign of United States social 
provisions, to solve the structural problem inherent in Esping-Andersen’s liberal welfare state 
regime’s provision of benefits to select groups (Skocpol 1995:251).   
 She identifies historical targeted antipoverty initiatives like poorhouses, mothers’ 
pensions, and the war on poverty as being politically unsustainable due specifically to their 
limited scope.  The divide over support for the war on poverty by benefit recipients in the 1960s 
and 1970s and the disdain for the programs by middle income tax payers in the 1970s and 1980s 
is specifically noted for moving southern whites and white urban ethnics away from the 
Democratic Party and towards the election of leaders who then dismantled those same policies.  
The perception that they were not benefiting from social welfare programs impeded the viability 
of those programs (Skocpol 1995:258).  This is untrue for programs that are perceived to target 
“everyone,” and not just the impoverished.  The endurance of Social Security’s income program 
for the elderly, as well as the support for benefits offered to Civil War veterans and the health 
education programs for expectant mothers, are evidence of the importance of universalism in 
social policy design (Skocpol 1995:259–266). 
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 On the eve of the debate over PRWORA, Skocpol noted that Clinton has “done a good 
job of highlighting the importance of moving in [the] direction” of providing more social support 
for working families caught in between rich and poor.  She saw a potential for “progressive” 
politics and social policy on Clinton’s part that would incorporate universalism (especially in 
health care) but not at the expense of stressing the “broadly shared values” of work and parental 
responsibility (Skocpol 1995:312). 
 The welfare legislation actually passed by Congress and signed into law by Clinton was 
quite different.  The shift in public opinion since the 1960s culminated in Clinton’s promise to 
“end welfare as we know it” by allowing “Congressional Republicans to take the initiative in 
revamping the entire system” (Trattner 1999:396).  The result was the Personal Responsibility 
and Work Opportunity Act of August 1996, which abolished Aid to Families with Dependent 
Children (the cash benefit program first created under the Social Security Act of 1935).  
PRWORA offered grants to the states, allowing them to set benefit levels and requiring them to 
cut off benefits to recipients after two years, regardless of employment status.  Benefits could not 
be received for more than five years in a lifetime, and other rules restricted eligibility for legal 
immigrants and women who had more children while currently receiving welfare, as well 
allowing invasive drug testing of recipients (Trattner 1999:397).  Congress’ stated aim was the 
promotion of “work” (in the private sector and away from the home), “job preparation” (in low 
wage service sector work) and heterosexual “marriage” ( regardless of the quality and safety of 
the relationship) (Hays 2003:4). 
 This legislation was not signed into law without the objection of some. One newspaper 
article in USA Today quotes Marian Wright Edelman, president of the Children’s Defense Fund, 
as saying, “President Clinton’s signature makes a mockery of his pledge not to hurt children,”  as 
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well as Senator Daniel Moynihan, “those involved will take this disgrace to their graves” (Welch 
1996).  A New York Times columnist declared that Clinton’s signature on the Act did more harm 
to children than any actions of the two Presidents before him (Welch 1996).  An assistant 
secretary at the Department of Health and Human Services resigned in protest (Trattner 
1999:398).  The contested PRWORA (and its reauthorization in 2002) was the last major social 
welfare legislation to date.  Opinions on its efficacy — at not simply reducing caseloads but 
actually reducing poverty and unemployment among current and former recipients — is still 
being debated. 
Post–welfare reform: The results and the future 
While those in the popular media debated whether or not welfare reform had been 
successful based on poverty statistics, caseload numbers, and anecdotal evidence (Eckholm 
2006, Samuelson 2006), Sharon Hays embedded herself with two social service offices providing 
Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF, the new AFDC), and other benefit programs, 
one in a small historic city and the other in a dangerous inner–city neighborhood.  As she 
completed her research, the number of welfare recipients fell from 12.2 million in 1996 to 5.3 
million in 2001 (2003:8).  Census records indicate that for the same period of time, poverty fell 
by 2 percent for all people, from 13.7 percent in 1996 to 11.7 percent in 2001. 
More importantly than the numerical data, Hays focused on the values of the nation as 
reflected in its laws.  PRWORA, she writes, “provides a reflected image of American culture and 
reinforces a system of beliefs about how all of us should behave” (2003:9).  The legislation is a 
social experiment in promoting a work ethic and a certain type of family values (Hays 2003, 10).  
For Hays, welfare is a response to the question of whether we should as a nation support 
individual economic self–sufficiency first and above all or if (for mothers, or all women) we 
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should promote traditional family values that keep them in the home.  It offers a “one–sided 
reflection” of the nation’s values and an often contradictory one (2003:15). 
Hays wonders if the “old family ideal” is dead and if we have lost our concern for 
children in our staunch promotion of self–sufficiency.  Yet of the four goals outlined in the Act, 
only one mentions work.  The others focus on the “formation and maintenance of two–parent 
families,” prevention and reduction of out–of–wedlock pregnancies, and the provision of benefits 
for needy families to allow children to be cared for in their own homes (2003:16–17). 
The value of work and family togetherness are moral and honorable, Hays believes, but 
they become contradictory within welfare reform in the context of the current social 
fragmentation and rising global inequality.  She writes, 
 
If you scrub off all the controversy and contradiction of welfare reform, you can find a 
set of honorable moral principles . . . independence, productivity, conscientious 
citizenship, family togetherness, social connection, community, and the well–being of 
children . . . The reasons they emerge as contradictory and punitive relative to welfare 
reform is that this takes place in the context of massive changes in family and work life, 
deepening levels of social distrust, rising social inequalities, and an increasingly 
competitive global marketplace . . . social and moral complexity [have been translated] 
into simplified slogans and stereotypes that obscure the more difficult dilemmas and the 
more disturbing social inequities involved (2003:21). 
 
These “national values” become distorted as they pass through the hands of the public, business 
owners, politicians, and especially the media.  The result manifests itself in what Hays calls the 
“Work Plan” which abandons notions of collective progress in favor of win–at–all–costs 
individualism and the “Family Plan” which champions only one particular type of traditional 
family that is increasingly no longer a reality for many Americans (Hays 2003:23–24). 
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 Looking beyond the value transmission function of the welfare state, Barbara Ehrenreich, 
in her foreword to Albelda and Whithorn’s Lost Ground, calls welfare reform (in the form of 
PRWORA) an initiative “launched against American workers by their employers in the wave of 
class warfare that began in the 1970s” (Albelda and Withorn 2002:ix).  Its “disciplining effect” 
extends to all workers, making them unwilling and unlikely to agitate for better working 
conditions or better pay because of the new holes in their social safety net.  For Ehrenreich, 
welfare reform is in line with union busting, drug testing, and increased workplace supervision.  
It is not simply an issue of racism or a women’s problem.  Rather it is a matter of class and of 
worker exploitation. 
In her essay in the same collection, Frances Fox Piven links the last major changes in 
welfare in the United States to the globalization of capital and abandonment of industry in favor 
of a service economy reliant on electronic information and transportation networks.  In the race 
to attract investors with low taxes and low wages, expensive social programs must be cut 
because they make a country uncompetitive.  The result, she says, is that: 
 
The lower tiers of the labor market are already characterized by growing instability and 
insecurity as a result of job restructuring and growing reliance on contingent workers.  To 
this mix we are now adding several million desperately poor women who have lost their 
welfare benefits and now compete with other low–wage workers for jobs that are already 
insecure (Gault and Um’rani 2000).  As a consequence, despite low levels of 
unemployment, insecurity is increasing at the bottom of the labor market (Albelda and 
Whithorn 2002:35). 
 
Piven believes that the current welfare system has created an indentured servant class who are 
forced into often demeaning labor situations in order to financially support themselves.  For both 
Piven and Ehrenreich, the problems with welfare and welfare reform extend far beyond a 
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domestic desire to instill a work–ethic in the poor to a global concerted effort by capital interests 
to create a docile work force at low and middle income levels.  However, while this is unspoken 
by those in control, the same old ideological and value arguments are used to justify it.  In 
contrast, Michel–Rolph Trouillot writes that by “Revamping old arguments in a new vocabulary, 
many explanations of poverty now blame the victims of globalization” (2003:57). 
 The increased power of capital to move beyond borders and therefore renegotiate the 
terms of labor in its favor, has occurred at the same time as the state claimed a lack of control 
over capital and the ability to rein in its excesses.  Western world leaders, beginning in 1972, 
made conscious decisions that led to the deregulation and therefore increasing control and power 
global financial markets and financiers have over the economy.  World leaders now claim that 
they are powerless to stop them.  As Trouillot says, “More often than not, these claims are 
convenient shields for choices that protect capital accumulation” (2003:62). 
 In concert with this intentional abdication of power to capital interests, the United States’ 
federal government has given increasing control to state and local governments to administer 
social welfare programs and determine benefit levels and eligibility.  This “New Federalism” 
manifests itself in the block grant provisions of PRWORA, putting welfare programs in danger 
of major budget cuts.  In reducing welfare spending by one dollar, a state now saves that entire 
dollar, where previously, under the federal matching funds program, the state would save only 40 
cents (Sawicky 1999:159).  If O’Connor’s theory of a fiscal crisis of the state is correct, 
continuous and significant benefit reductions were inevitable. 
Conclusion 
 Over the last 35 years, with the federal government’s aid, the capital markets assumed 
control over the economy, creating the current post–Fordist regime of accumulation and the 
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conditions of poverty and unemployment that have accompanied this shift.  Likewise, Congress 
and the executive branch of the federal government have handed over control of the financing of 
the increasingly restricted welfare programs to relatively more conservative local and state 
governments who have responded to their own budget crises and ideologically opposed 
constituents by trimming benefits, stiffening sanctions, and decreasing eligibility.  The scholarly 
research has clearly demonstrated this shift of power, as well as the move to a post–Fordist 
regime of accumulation that led to it and the attendant explosion of a popular conservative 
ideology.  In reviewing this literature, I have attempted to provide an adequate theoretical and 
historical background in order to understand the changes in the welfare system and why they 
occurred at the national level.   
 Further research was conducted to examine how the outcome of these seismic changes to 
the economy and welfare policy were framed by newspaper editorials printed prior to the passing 
of PRWORA in 1996 and what this framing meant for the public’s perception of welfare, 
poverty, and the government’s role in solving related problems.  Editorials from 1964, before the 
signing of the Economic Opportunity Act, were used as a basis for comparison, to demonstrate 
any differences in how poverty and welfare were represented by the popular media before the 
aforementioned changes.  The following chapter describes the research design and methodology 
used in this study. 
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Chapter Three: Research Design and Methodology 
 
 One of the first steps in the research design process was determining the most appropriate 
and valid sources of texts that would provide an accurate view of how poverty, welfare, and 
government welfare policy were being thought of and talked about prior to the signing of the 
EOA and PRWORA.  Editorials and op–ed pieces (hereafter “editorials”), as opposed to news 
stories, were selected for study because they can be seen as summaries of the ideology behind 
the decisions they consider and are more pointedly concerned with opinion.  Izadi and Saghaye–
Biria see these editorials as expressions of elite ideology which can be disseminated as a means 
to “organize, maintain, and stabilize particular forms of power relations” (2007:140).  These 
texts can then be analyzed as a conceptual structure invoked in readers, “the worlds . . . they can 
consider real” (Krippendorf 2004:63).  In other words, though elite newspaper editorials are not 
direct expressions of popular opinion, they can and do control how issues, especially those 
regarding complicated and unfamiliar national policy problems, are discussed in the media.  
Consequently, they influence how average readers begin to conceptualize the problems, their 
causes and solutions. 
Sampling 
 Due to the nature of this study, a purposive (non–random, relevance) sampling technique 
was used in the selection of the texts, a common practice in studies of ongoing issues or 
controversies (Riffe, Lacy, Fico 2005:101).  In doing discourse analysis, this often means that 
texts must be read and analyzed prior to being considered for the sample (Krippendorff 
2004:119).  The number of potential texts is systematically lowered by elimination until it 
reaches a manageable amount. 
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 I chose the New York Times (NYT), Washington Post (WP) and Wall Street Journal 
(WSJ) for this study based on their large circulation numbers as well as their respected coverage 
of national issues and events.  These three newspapers have been termed “elite” and are thought 
to “serve an intermedia agenda setting function for other news sources” (Izadi and Saghaye–
Biria 2007:148).  Circulation of the Wall Street Journal is second in the United States only to 
USA Today, and is followed by the New York Times in third.  The Washington Post, ranking 
number five, is known and respected for its attention to legislative and governmental issues, 
being located in the capital of Washington, DC (Audit Bureau of Circulation, 2008). 
 In searching for editorials written about the Economic Opportunity Act, I chose January 
8, 1964 as the start date for the search parameters, as this was the date that President Johnson 
officially presented his plan for a war on poverty to the nation in his State of the Union address.  
The search period ended on August 31, 1964, just 11 days after the bill was signed into law.  
Indexing methods varied for each of the three newspapers due to the age of the editorials and 
each source was searched separately for two search terms, “war on poverty” and “economic 
opportunity act.” 
 I searched the New York Times using their online archive search at 
www.newyorktimes.com.  “Economic opportunity act” plus “editorial” resulted in one accurate 
hit, while a search for “war on poverty” plus “editorial” produced 35 additional texts, of which 
only two were actually editorials focused on national poverty and welfare issues.  The 
Washington Post’s online archive search (www.washingtonpost.com) produced zero hits for 
“economic opportunity act” plus “editorial” and only one hit for “war on poverty” and 
“editorial.”  As a result, I previewed the 245 hits returned when only “war on poverty” was 
searched and kept only those texts determined to be of an editorial nature for the sample.   
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 The Wall Street Journal’s archives from 1964 are not available electronically but are 
available on microfiche and are searchable by a printed index of keywords.  The terms “war on 
poverty” and “economic opportunity act” did not turn up any results, nor did “welfare.”  
Numerous pieces were listed under the search term “poverty,” and were indicated to be either 
editorials or news articles.  From the editorial results, I then narrowed down my sample to 
include only those columns which specifically addressed poverty as it related to the recent 
government initiatives. 
 Editorials written about PRWORA were compiled using the Lexis–Nexis search engine.  
Though there was no logical external beginning date for texts in this search, I started the search 
parameters at January 1, 1996 so that the length of time searched for both 1996 and 1964 was 
approximately equivalent.  Again, I ended the searched dates at August 31, 1996, little more than 
a week after Clinton signed PRWORA into law. 
 I initially searched the full text of all available texts for the aforementioned dates for all 
three newspapers using the search term “personal responsibility and work opportunity 
reconciliation act.”  This resulted in only three returned news articles, none of which were 
editorials.  Secondly, I searched the term “welfare reform,” resulting in hundreds of hits.  These 
results were then further narrowed by adding the term “editorial” to the search, which produced a 
sufficient yet manageable number of hits from each of the three sources.  The final step in 
selecting the 1996 texts for the sample involved reading each piece and discarding those whose 
primary focus was a topic other than “welfare reform.”  Most notably, this involved the 
elimination of editorials that mentioned welfare reform only in relation to the political impact its 
institution would have on President Clinton’s reelection campaign and political legacy.   A total 
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of 54 editorials remained in the sample for the period between January 1, 1996 and August 31, 
1996. 
 
Table 1.  Number of editorials in sample from each source and year 
             1964              1996        Both Years 
New York Times               2                16                18 
Wall Street Journal              10                 6                16 
Washington Post               5                32                37 
Total               17                54                71 
 
 
Questions for analysis 
 In reviewing and analyzing the texts, I looked for what was said in reference to the 
following three “survey” questions.  The editorials’ “answers” were then combined within each 
text and across each sample year to construct coherent narratives of poverty and welfare as they 
were presented to readers. 
 First, what does the editorial portray as the primary problem in the area of poverty and 
welfare, if there is one identified at all?  In answering this question, I attempted to understand 
what underlying issue provoked the editorial writer’s piece.  Why was this text being written?  
Secondly, what does the editorial identify as the cause of this problem or issue it identifies?  
Specifically, did the writer make arguments for individual or structural origins of the problem?  
Lastly, what does the editorial portray as the federal government’s ideal role in and obligation 
toward ending the problem it identifies?  Additionally, what other policy suggestions or 
criticisms were made and how did they reflect the answers to the first two questions? 
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 The information provided by the editorials, in light of prior scholarly research on the 
impact of the media on public opinion and policy (Druckman and Nelson 2003, Druckman and 
Parkin 2005, Herman and Chomsky 1988), was used to answer broader research questions.  
Namely, how did public perception of poverty and the poor change from the 1960s to the 1990s?  
How did public welfare programs come to be seen as a cause of poverty instead of a solution to 
it?  And specifically, to what extent did the news media encourage and facilitate this shift in 
public opinion?  The following chapters attempt to provide answers to the questions through a 
critical analysis of the sample texts. 
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Chapter Four: 1964 
 
 
 In reading the editorials from the 1964 sample, I expected to find a consensus about the 
existence and extent of poverty, and general support for the war on poverty programs in theory, 
if not in execution.  The editorials, however, varied wildly from source to source on the 
perceived extent of the poverty problem, as well as on what action should be taken.   These 
differences are reviewed and discussed in this chapter. 
 Despite their differences, I found that the editorials shared one common idea that 
differentiates them from the 1996 sample.  Each editorial assumes that the economy would 
indefinitely continue its upswing, providing job growth that would eventually make poverty 
nearly obsolete.  An analysis of this assumption and its impact on poverty discourse concludes 
the chapter.  
Defining the problem 
 Both the New York Times and the Washington Post editorials assumed that the existence 
of poverty, and its status as a paramount domestic problem, was evident to their readers.  Neither 
newspaper offers much evidence of the poverty they know to exist but they continually remark 
on its severity, especially in light of the nation’s general economic wellbeing.  The following 
quote from the New York Times is typical of the way the prevalence of poverty is represented by 
the two newspapers. 
 
President Johnson’s declaration of a war on poverty has served as a compelling reminder 
to many Americans that millions of their fellow citizens are existing in a bleak netherland 
of hopelessness in the midst of unprecedented prosperity.  The very fact that the United 
States has produced mass affluence while maintaining something close to mass poverty is 
an uncomfortably formidable challenge. (June 24, 1964) 
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 Likewise, the Washington Post notes the “persistence of privation and want in a society 
characterized by growing affluence” (January 27, 1964).  The same editorial goes on to briefly 
mention the number of families living with annual incomes below $3000 as its proof of this 
privation and want. 
 Though the existence of poverty may seem self-evident in the United States to the editors 
of these two sources, even the assumption of poverty and its prevalence are impacted by the 
editorial viewpoint of a newspaper, and consequently how its readers view reality.  Unlike the 
widespread misery that the Washington Post and New York Times wrote about, the Wall Street 
Journal and its editorial writers can find little to no real poverty of which to speak, and they 
challenge their readers to go out and find the poor that supposedly exist.  Vermont Royster 
writes: 
 
. . . spend a few days in one of the slums in New York, or any other of our great cities.  
There, believe us, you will find poverty by the standards of the greater part of the nation.  
But there also, believe us, you will find the tempest–tossed from other lands to whom this 
“poverty” is something they fled to from something far worse . . . And while you are thus 
journeying, try one across your own country. . . then ask yourself if a fifth of the nation 
is, really, ground down in the hopeless circle of poverty (March 26, 1964). 
 
Here, the poverty problem is minimized for readers by making it a matter of visibility.  This 
argument is the counterpoint to other media outlets’ championing of The Other America: Poverty 
in the United States, the best selling book that addressed the increasing isolation of the poor (Eve 
Edstrom, Washington Post, January 19, 1964).  Poverty that is found in the United States can 
thus be explained away by noting its relativity.  Since our poor would be considered rich by the 
standards of the developing world, they therefore are not objectively poor at all. 
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 More subtle, and more disturbing, are the racist implications of the above quote.  It can 
be read to imply that others who came to this country, namely African Americans whose 
relatives were slaves brought from Africa, are ungrateful for the advantages that their ancestors’ 
passage gave them, unlike more recent European immigrants who appreciate what the United 
States has to offer.  Poor urban blacks, and likewise, poor rural whites can become an ungrateful, 
greedy enemy to hard work and individualism when compared to the destitution of Eastern 
Europe or the Third World. 
 Additionally, the Wall Street Journal invokes readers’ cynicism about politics as a means 
of raising doubts about the legitimacy of the “poverty problem.”  Vermont Royster writes: “You 
can hardly pick up a newspaper or tune in a TV set without hearing about this blight of poverty.  
Almost everybody knows this is a distorted image but hardly anybody dares say so for fear of 
being damned as a heartless wretch.  This is what makes the poverty boom such a marvelous 
political ploy” (Wall Street Journal, March 26, 1964).  Wall Street Journal readers are given a 
vision of reality in which contradictory elements are unified seamlessly.  In this view, there is 
little to no actual poverty.  What poverty does exist is simply poverty in relation to mass 
prosperity and therefore not really poverty at all.  The issue of poverty in the midst of plenty is 
merely a cynical political ploy by a liberal Democratic president.  If readers do not believe this 
version of reality the editorials suggest, they are encouraged to drive around their town and look 
themselves for these nonexistent poor people.  The result is that the reality for the readership of 
this newspaper is a world in which the EOA, or any government antipoverty program, is 
unnecessary and should be opposed. 
 In contrast, the Washington Post and New York Times offer recitations of the same 
income statistics to back up their claims of widespread suffering.  This begs the question why 
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neither paper felt it necessary to offer further “proof” of poverty’s presence in the United States, 
in contrast to the Wall Street Journal’s “proof” of its absence, instead writing with the 
assumption that it does exist to the extent that it is a major domestic problem.  Do both 
newspapers assume that their readers are familiar with the issue?  It is most likely that the 
problem of poverty needs little explanation or defense because of the ample news articles and 
television news stories devoted to the topic as well as the popularity of books like The Other 
America.    
 The prevalence of ostensibly objective news information on the war on poverty may also 
explain why there were more editorials written in the Wall Street Journal on the topics of 
poverty and welfare than in the Washington Post or New York Times combined.  The Wall Street 
Journal had the task of convincing its readership that what was being presented on the evening 
news, in popular books, in other newspapers, and by their own President was misleading and 
inaccurate.  Some of these editorials seek mainly to refocus the discussion on the media and 
politician’s exaggeration of the problem.  They are an explicit attempt to reconstruct the problem 
in a way that allows for the blaming of politicians and other media.  The editorials can then also 
deny the need for interest or action on the part of the audience.  If readers come away with the 
idea that there is no problem with poverty in the United States, they can reject any attempts to 
solve it. 
Causes of poverty 
 When mentioning the causes of this poverty epidemic, the New York Times and 
Washington Post almost universally cited the failure of the education system and other 
government institutions to prepare the populace for the industrialized economy.  Roscoe 
Drummond writes in the Washington Post, “This kind of poverty is not due to the failure of our 
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economic system.  It is due to the failure of our society to provide the education, the job training 
and re–training, the encouragement and the environment needed to help the poor become 
productive and the productive become more prosperous” (April 15, 1964).  This is not to say that 
the writer believes that all poverty will be abolished with a well–educated and trained 
population.  It is only this widespread destitution in the midst of plenty, so different from the 
poverty of the Depression, that can be cured with the proposed opportunity–based programs. 
 While advancing an argument for structural causes of poverty, there are scattered 
references to a lack of discipline or will, as well as undeservingness, on the part of the poor.  
This results, they argue, in some remaining in poverty no matter what action the federal 
government takes.  Despite these mentions, the two newspapers tell a story of poor Americans 
who are trapped in poverty mostly due to their limited education and skill.  Yet emphasizing that 
some of the poor will never rise up due to their own unwillingness to play by the rules ensures 
that those in power are shielded from accountability when and if their plans fail.  That is, if the 
war on poverty programs that the Washington Post and New York Times support are failing to lift 
large numbers of people from below the poverty line, it is because many people clearly do not 
want to be out of poverty.   
 Again, the Wall Street Journal offers a contradictory view, focusing mainly on the 
behavior of the poor and resisting attempts to fault macro structures and institutions for persistent 
poverty.  William Henry Chamberlin accuses Johnson and his policies of ignoring the “essential 
dynamo,” that is, “the presence, in the individual character, of the element of will to take 
advantage of opportunities, however limited, to treat obstacles as spurs to achievement” (August 
11, 1964).  In sum, there are plenty of opportunities already for the poor to lift themselves out of 
poverty — they just have to want it badly enough.   
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With some columns framing the existence of mass poverty in the United States as a 
media creation, or blaming its existence on the poor themselves, the Wall Street Journal’s 
editorial page also lauded poverty for being a positive character building exercise, using 
Abraham Lincoln as an example of someone whose poverty proved “useful.”  Even if readers 
can accept the existence of poverty that they cannot see for themselves, and can sympathize with 
the poor even though their poverty is not on par with that of the Third World, they must at least 
be able to admit that poverty can be beneficial.  After all, Chamberlin writes, “it would not 
require any exhaustive research to turn up thousands of instances of individuals who emerged 
from early poverty to business and professional success” and who go on to credit their early 
struggles as beneficial (Wall Street Journal, August 11, 1964).  The Wall Street Journal made 
real for its readers a society in which there actually is no poverty except that of those who are 
poor by choice, making the “problem” of poverty in an affluent society no problem at all. 
The New York Times and Washington Post have presented to their readers a serious 
poverty problem caused by the failure of the education system and requiring the sympathy (and 
guilt) of the public.  However, they are assured that some will always remain in poverty due to 
their unwillingness to adopt mainstream values and habits.  The brief nature of these remarks 
does not diminish their ability to undercut the idea that there should be public responsibility to 
assist those in poverty.  Yet the editorials do not fail to mention that an unknowable number of 
these poor people are actually to blame for their own poverty, making it easier to minimize or 
ignore their plight. 
Government action 
 Only the two editorials in the New York Times were clear and straightforward about what 
was needed to reduce poverty, namely, more government programs and entitlements.  The 
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newspaper was supportive of the Economic Opportunity Act, criticizing it only for its limited 
scope and simultaneously calling for the “expansion of other needed public services” (July 21, 
1964).  They strongly supported increasing federal government involvement and funding for 
myriad other welfare benefits.  The following quote not only summarizes the New York Times’ 
position, but demonstrates the forcefulness with which it calls for this strengthening of the 
welfare state: 
 
Winning the war on poverty calls for a multiple offensive employing all the measures 
now available.  It is essential to sustain economic growth that can help open up new 
opportunities and to prevent any rise in the numbers below the poverty line.  The 
Government’s housing and welfare programs must be expanded, and the plan to provide 
medical care for the aged enacted. 
 Success also will demand special measures requiring more imagination and larger 
resources than the Administration is deploying.  If the campaign is to be more than an 
appealing battle cry in an election year, it will have to make a much more intensive effort 
to improve educational facilities and enlarge needed public services.  These can open up 
opportunities for the young, create jobs, and enhance individual dignity. 
 Even then the Administration will only be conducting a partial war.  It has 
completely overlooked the plight of those aged 65 or older who head 3.2 million families 
in the ranks of the poor.  They cannot be removed from poverty by training or public 
works; but they can be elevated above the poverty line without any lengthy 
reconnaissance or elaborate strategy.  It will take direct cash payments — a solution that 
the Administration has not yet contemplated despite its propaganda barrage. 
 The President’s sincerity is manifest.  But the war against poverty cannot be won 
on the cheap.  It will take a concerted attack, involving long and costly battles. (June 24, 
1964) 
 
While I anticipated finding this strong support for the war on poverty initiatives, and more 
generally for increased federal involvement in welfare and poverty relief, throughout all three 
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sources, the support from the Washington Post editorials was more subdued and tempered by 
statements criticizing policies that aimed to redistribute wealth.  The editorials universally 
praised Johnson’s efforts to “help the poor help themselves” without “increasing handouts to 
decrease distress” (Roscoe Drummond, April 15, 1964).  The lack of wealth redistribution 
programs in the new war on poverty becomes evidence, for writer Walter Lippman, of a positive 
new historical milieu.  The Kennedy and Johnson approaches to poverty eradication recognize 
that the economic pie is limitless in size, and that government poverty policy must work in 
concert with fiscal policy whose aim should always be to continually increase the size of this pie 
by allowing capitalism to flourish (Washington Post, March 19, 1964). 
 This concentration on capital investment, however, requires a combined effort with 
education and training programs to create a workforce to man the jobs that will be created.  The 
Washington Post’s editorials neither gave support to the idea of “handouts” nor even mentioned 
aid to those who were either unable to work or found themselves still unemployed despite their 
new training.  While it placed the blame for poverty squarely on poor education and illiteracy — 
the structural failure of the United States education system — its suggested correction for this 
failure would eventually place the onus back on the individual.  As long as the federal 
government could claim that individuals have the opportunity for advancement through 
education in an ever–growing economy, any failure to escape poverty becomes personal.  The 
Washington Post has restructured the problem and its solution for its readers so that eventually 
individual blame for poverty is logical.  If readers support the EOA, and it is enacted, the only 
remaining poor will be those who are unmotivated to take advantages of the opportunities they 
have been given and are therefore, undeserving of further help.  In sum, the EOA cannot fail to 
eliminate poverty, because any remaining poverty after the programs are implemented can be 
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blamed on the poor.  This newspaper has created a false dichotomy, eliminating any other 
potential influences like the economy, on an increase or decrease in poverty. 
 As could be surmised based on the newspaper’s stance on the existence and causes of 
poverty, as well as its belief in the lack of structural barriers to universal prosperity in the United 
States, the Wall Street Journal is highly critical of the Economic Opportunity Act, both in its 
logistics and in its underlying assumptions.  One editorial states “. . . the Federal officialdom is 
inherently incapable of devising and administering effective programs applicable to all parts of a 
diverse nation” (July 28, 1964).  Work programs are faulted for having an “aura of make–work” 
(March 17, 1964).  The programs as a whole are called “ill–defined,” and the entire effort, 
“splintered” (Harley L. Lutz, April 15, 1964). 
 Yet these ill–defined programs are only symptoms of the government overstepping its 
duties.  One column in the Wall Street Journal that most clearly demonstrates the paper’s general 
editorial outlook on the role of government states “ . . . promoting the general welfare was never 
intended to endorse what has come to be understood as the federally subsidized welfare state” 
(February 14, 1964).  Another Wall Street Journal editorial by Harley L. Lutz identifies five 
areas of government involvement that need correction, including abolishing the minimum wage, 
reducing the corporate tax burden, ending support for labor unions, and ending any entitlement to 
welfare benefits.  For Lutz, “A bona fide Government attack on poverty must include, therefore, 
modification of the rules and bureaucratic attitudes which hamper the provision and efficient use 
of capital” (Wall Street Journal, April 15, 1964).  This attitude — that government’s primary 
duty is to ensure the unfettered operation of capitalism, followed by preparing and maintaining 
its needed workforce — though hardly marginal, could not yet be considered mainstream.  By 
constructing the ideal role of government as primarily a giver of corporate welfare as a form of 
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public welfare, the Wall Street Journal legitimized this view for its readership and expanded its 
reach years before it become either a popular notion or a reality. 
Analysis 
 I had anticipated finding a general consensus in the opinions expressed in the 1964 
editorials, with perhaps some dissenting views printed in each newspaper in the interest of 
fairness.  While I did not expect every editorial to celebrate Johnson’s efforts and uncritically 
accept the war on poverty as manifested in the EOA, I assumed that there would be in all of the 
sample sources at least some tacit acceptance that there existed a problem of widespread poverty 
in the United States and that the federal government had some responsibility to change this. 
 While this sentiment was most fully and forcefully expressed by the New York Times, 
that newspaper printed only two editorials on the subject, even though 209 news articles made 
mention of the term “war on poverty” over the same time period.  I can find no sure reason as to 
why so little editorial coverage was given to a topic that was so obviously important and 
newsworthy.  Did the New York Times assume that their editorial position was already shared by 
most of their readership?  Was this position articulated more subtly, and perhaps more 
effectively, in its news stories?  The reason for the lack of editorial coverage may be equally as 
informative as what the editorials themselves had to say, though determining this is beyond the 
scope of this study. 
 The Wall Street Journal’s call for understanding poverty as individual in nature was 
unsurprising given its audience of businessmen, bankers, and financial industry workers.  
However, I did not expect to find any editorials in this earlier sample which espoused so 
completely a position that I located as emerging strongly only after 1973 — namely that 
government welfare policy should limit itself to programs that provide for the corporate, and not 
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public, welfare with the belief that a properly functioning capitalist system benefits all who work 
hard.  Though seemingly still a minority opinion at the time, this idea found full articulation over 
a series of ten editorials in the eight months before the EOA, a vast expansion of the federal 
welfare state, became law. 
 As noticeable and important as these differences in position among the sources are, what 
is most striking is the one assumption that binds them all and influences the vision of the future 
readers are left with and what this future means for welfare policy.  This shared assumption is the 
inevitability of unlimited future economic expansion which means ever–increasing standards of 
living for all.  It is stated explicitly, and in no uncertain terms, by editorials in two sources.  
Walter Lippman writes: 
But in this generation, one might say in the past thirty years, a revolutionary idea has 
taken hold in the advanced countries of the world.  The size of the pie to be divided can 
be increased by invention, organization, capital investment, and fiscal policy, and then a 
whole society, not just one part of it, will grow richer. . .  
 The Kennedy–Johnson campaign against poverty operates in this historical 
context.  The basic assumption is that the American economy can readily produce the 
means to reduce poverty — which was estimated as the lot of one–third of the nation 
when Franklin Roosevelt took office and is now down to one–fifth (Washington Post, 
March 19, 1964). 
 
Chamberlin writes in the Wall Street Journal: 
The social and economic history of the United States shows a pattern of ever improving 
living standards, always touching a higher peak, even after intervening setbacks.  There is 
no reason to doubt that this pattern will continue indefinitely, barring some unforeseeable 
and improbable catastrophe like a nuclear attack. (March 20, 1964). 
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  Even when there is no mention of economic growth within an editorial, this assumption 
still informs the policy discussion therein.  For the Wall Street Journal this translates into the 
belief that no government welfare programs are necessary, only policy that encourages capital 
expansion.  If enough new jobs are made available, anyone willing to work will have the 
opportunity to do so.  The poverty problem would then take care of itself.  The New York Times 
and Washington Post come to a different conclusion.  It is the government’s responsibility to do 
everything in its power, including ending discrimination and financing training programs, in 
order to help people take advantage of this national prosperity. 
 Regardless of their positions on policy, by promoting the idea that the economy and 
living standards would continue their upswing, the newspapers helped to lay the groundwork for 
the individualist arguments against comprehensive welfare policies that emerged in earnest later.  
Pointing to evidence in the media of an ever–growing economy (with expanded job 
opportunities), and of new training or education programs being enacted by the federal 
government, regardless of whether or not these opportunities existed to an appreciable degree, 
one could begin to make the argument that poverty really is a case of “slothfully missed” chances 
to improve one’s lot (Mink and Solinger 2003:337).  Though the editorial discourse leading up to 
the passing of the Economic Opportunity Act varied in its identification of the problems and its 
causes, as well as the proposed solutions, the effect of the editorials’ common assumption was to 
encourage the future strengthening of the belief in poverty as the unwillingness of some to 
subscribe to the mainstream American value of hard work.   
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Chapter Five: 1996 
 
The sample of 1996 editorials offered a nearly even distribution of those who favored the 
passage of PRWORA and those who opposed it.  Despite the difference in opinion on this 
particular welfare reform bill, there was widespread condemnation of current welfare policy as 
well as the assignment of responsibility for a host of social ills to the growth of the welfare rolls.  
This near consensus on the evils of AFDC meant that readers of these editorials were exposed to 
a limited discussion of alternatives to the dominant view.  The discourse was overwhelmingly 
one–sided, with little representation from voices that fingered global economic changes as a 
central cause of poverty and the continued necessity of welfare.  In this chapter I discuss the 
nature of this limited discourse and its effect on the public’s perception of what welfare, in the 
form of AFDC, had accomplished since its inception sixty-one years earlier. 
Defining the problem 
While the 1964 editorials concerned themselves with the proliferation of poverty, or the 
media and President’s exaggeration of the extent of poverty, the focus of the 1996 discourse was 
the system intended to aid those poor.  Those both for and against welfare reform as represented 
by PRWORA overwhelmingly found fault with the current Aid to Families with Dependent 
Children cash assistance program, in place under various names and incarnations since the New 
Deal.  Douglas Besharov’s headline in the Wall Street Journal succinctly sums up many of the 
editorials’ arguments: “Welfare: An Albatross for Young Mothers” (February 28, 1996). 
 It was the Wall Street Journal that most forcefully made the claim that the modern 
problem was no longer how to get people out of poverty, but how to get people off the welfare 
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rolls.  It is referred to by Will Marshall, president of the Democratic Leadership Council’s 
Progressive Policy Institute, as both an “unreformable system” and “flawed beyond repair,” 
exemplifying a “dysfunctional bureaucracy that flouts [Americans’] values and feeds a self 
perpetuating culture of poverty” (August 1, 1996).  Another editorial states: “To wit, the current 
welfare system ruins the lives of the recipients” (Wall Street Journal, August 1, 1996). 
 To further this claim, George Melloan positions the United States’ problems with welfare 
as part of a larger global rejection of “welfare politics.”  Though it is in the United States, where 
the welfare state is targeted towards those of lesser means, that the issue of fairness becomes 
paramount.  He writes, “Public confidence in the ability of the state to deliver economic security 
with justice is diminishing everywhere” (Wall Street Journal, July 29, 1996), likening the 
situation in the United States to the changes occurring to Germany’s incomparable universal 
social benefit system. 
 A majority of the Washington Post’s editorialists, though largely against the passage of 
the welfare reform bill, agreed that AFDC was itself a problem, even though PRWORA was not 
the solution.  William Raspberry writes, “What gets lost in our anguished argument is that 
welfare was broken and we couldn’t figure out how, starting with the present system, to fix it” 
(August 8, 1996).  Raspberry’s argument is repeatedly asserted throughout columns in both the 
Washington Post and the New York Times that urge the vetoing of PROWRA: 
The current system may not do much for work, self–respect, family, or self–discipline 
(Colbert I. King, Washington Post, July 27, 1996). 
No one — or very few, anyway — would argue that the current welfare system is a good one.  
Mr. Clinton was and remains right to try to change it (Washington Post, July 25, 1996). 
Of course the welfare system needs replacing (E.J. Dionne, Jr., Washington Post, July 
23, 1996). 
The current welfare system has no defenders (Washington Post, July 18, 1996). 
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To find serious fault with the House and Senate bill is not to deny the need for reform 
(New York Times, July 25, 1996). 
We must turn away from the failed system (David T. Ellwood, New York Times, July 
22, 1996). 
 
This is not to say that there was no recognition of poverty as being a valid and pressing social 
problem.  Numerous editorials in the Washington Post and New York Times dropped the oft–
quoted statistic of a possible one million more children falling into poverty with the passing of 
PRWORA (Daniel P. Moynihan, Washington Post, August 4, 1996; Isabel Sawhill, Washington 
Post, July 26, 1996; New York Times, August 1, 1996; David T. Ellwood, New York Times, July 
22, 1996).  E.J. Dionne, Jr., writing after Clinton signed the bill into law, hoped that, “Perhaps 
we can finally talk about the issue that mattered all along: how to reduce poverty, joblessness, 
illegitimacy, and crime” (Washington Post, August 5, 1996).  Yet this acknowledgment was rare. 
 Dionne’s statement is a recognition of one of the central assumptions of the PRWORA 
discourse — that welfare dependency is at the heart of poverty, crime, out of wedlock births, and 
other “urban pathologies.”  For those framing the discussion in 1996, poverty, once considered 
the disease, becomes only a symptom of the greater ill of welfare, regardless of which side of the 
welfare reform debate one stands on.  Establishing welfare, and its “abuses” (Washington Post, 
August 29, 1996), as the concern of these editorials has the effect of automatically strengthening 
the argument for welfare reform in any incarnation.  Public perception of the need for changes to 
the current system, as wrong–headed as policy experts and social scientists may claim those 
changes are, are inevitable if those same experts declare the current situation untenable. 
 As a Washington Post editorial said, the current welfare system had “no defenders” (July 
18, 1996), even within a perceived liberal media organization (Wall Street Journal, August 1, 
1996).  If this is true, further arguments to sustain it become, in the public’s eyes, illogical.  
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Opponents of welfare reform, along with its supporters, have presented their cases in such a way 
that the reader is left with little choice but to find serious fault with AFDC and to advocate for a 
fundamental change to the program, at the expense of attention to the condition of poverty that 
initially made AFDC necessary.  Thus, these editorials may well have helped to shape a public 
perception of welfare as a cause of social ill, not as a remedy to it. 
Causes of poverty 
 Not every editorial blamed the welfare system for the dependence, poverty, teen 
pregnancy and the like, though such dissenting voices were certainly in the minority.  For the 
most part, they found themselves almost exclusively published in the New York Times.  An 
editorial page review of William Julius Wilson’s latest book claims: “Mr. Wilson argues 
persuasively that urban social pathologies are related not to declining values, but to the 
disappearance of jobs and the social coherence they provide . . . the poor are sealed off from both 
jobs and information about them” (August 25, 1996).  Additionally, there is mention of the “job 
shortage for low–skilled workers” due to deindustrialization (Bob Herbert, August 5, 1996), a 
changing economy that the federal government did not prepare for or effectively respond to 
(Sheldon Danziger, February 23, 1996), and the belief that “the economic prospects of [welfare 
recipients] have been diminished by labor market changes, global competition, and technological 
advances” (June 1, 1996). 
 There were a limited number of editorials that even mentioned the possibility of larger 
structural forces like globalization and deindustrialization playing a part in the failure of the 
government to eradicate, or even reduce, poverty under the current system of welfare programs.  
Instead, writers overwhelmingly expressed the belief that welfare itself is a social problem that 
spawned, and then operated to encourage, other social problems.  It does so by disincentivizing, 
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even punishing, the values that Americans hold dear, such as hard work, marriage and personal 
responsibility. 
 This quote excerpted below, from Will Marshall’s editorial in the Wall Street Journal, 
makes the claim that the public needs no convincing that welfare has become a cause of poverty: 
To most Americans, however, the sky has already fallen.  They view the current welfare 
system as flawed beyond repair because it fails to promote the right values: work, 
marriage, parental responsibility.  Whereas professional advocates portray welfare as a 
benign “safety net” for the poor, the public rightly sees it as a trap that smothers 
initiative, instills passivity and dependence, and isolates the poor in a public subsistence 
economy rather than offering them real opportunities to become productive and self 
sufficient” (August 1, 1996). 
 
More than once in this column, Marshall asserts that the “overwhelming majority” of Americans 
agree with his own views on welfare.  In doing this, just as other editorials presented welfare as 
obviously the problem, he makes his points seem inarguable, despite offering no evidence to 
support them.  How can readers disagree with the majority of their fellow citizens, who, they are 
being told, see the problems of welfare as self–evident?  The assumptions that undergird the 
writers’ opinions about welfare are presented as unassailable facts, leaving readers with the 
understanding that welfare is almost universally considered the cause of poverty, and the reason 
that the poor reject their own mainstream values. 
 Marshall’s piece, of course, is just one of many that express the same belief — that it is 
the specifics of the current welfare policy that exacerbates the problems welfare legislation was 
created to solve.  The following quotes are examples of the language used to describe bad deeds 
of the welfare system: 
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 [Welfare] is a perfect formula for moral and ethical irresponsibility (Robert C. 
Waterbury, Wall Street Journal, August 8, 1996). 
The welfare system discourages work, encourages dependence, and can foster family 
breakdown (New York Times July 25, 1996). 
[Welfare reform] would put an end to the policy of something for nothing, of penalizing 
work and marriage, and isolating the poor from the economic and cultural mainstream 
(Joseph I. Lieberman, New York Times, July 25, 1996). 
Welfare subsidizes and helps sustain illegitimacy; it is illegitimacy’s economic life–
support system (William J. Bennett, Washington Post, August 18, 1996). 
 
What is important about these statements is their assumption of a causal relationship between 
welfare and unemployment.  Just as the 1964 sample editorials announced that a lack of 
education and training was preventing full employment while presenting little to no evidence to 
support this assertion, many of the 1996 columns do the same, relying not on factual evidence, 
but on readers’ sense of fairness and morality as a means of “proving” the insidious nature of 
welfare.  This is further aided by the credentials of those who wrote these editorials.  Senators, 
governors, and well known columnists all spoke of the horrors of welfare.  No sane reader could 
think of supporting a system that “rewards moral irresponsibility” (Robert C. Waterbury, Wall 
Street Journal, August 8, 1996), “discourages work” (New York Times, July 25, 1996), or 
contributes to out–of–wedlock births (George Melloan, Wall Street Journal. July 29, 1996). 
 In framing their problems with welfare policy as a moral issue (and welfare recipients as 
immoral or has having values different from most Americans) instead of a complicated 
confluence of history, policy, and economics, these editorial writers have reduced the issue for 
their readers to a basic question of right or wrong.  As both Izadi and Saghaye–Biria (2007) and 
Krippendorf (2004) described, readers rely on elite media to simplify and condense complicated 
or confusing issues and to help construct their reality for them.  These newspapers built public 
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support for the dismantling of the federal welfare state through the creation of a reality in which 
welfare was the origination of all things offensive to their readers’ moral sensibilities.  Even 
those writers who objected to PRWORA’s “reforms” contributed to this support by their 
insistence that it was this particular bill that was so odious, but that some type of reform was 
necessary. 
Government action 
 Complementing this conception of welfare recipients as lazy, dependent, and unwilling to 
work, most of the editorials (in all three sources) that made policy suggestions recommended 
“responsibility” requirements on the part of recipients.  This usually came in the form of 
mandatory employment.  William Raspberry writes in the Washington Post, “Philosophically, 
the notion that welfare recipients ought to work is an easy sell” (August 19, 1996).  Others 
agreed: 
 
It makes sense to transform the welfare office from a place where people go to sign up 
for checks to a center where the poor and jobless can turn to find work (Washington Post, 
February 10, 1996). 
We must turn away from the failed system focused on determining eligibility and check 
writing and create a new one based on work and responsibility (David T. Ellwood, New 
York Times, July 22, 1996). 
Enactment of PRWORA would be a first step toward replacing the unconditional welfare 
entitlement with a new social compact based on work and mutual responsibility (Wall 
Street Journal, August 1, 1996). 
 
Where the editorials writers did disagree was in the amount of federal government involvement 
and funds needed to support job growth and placement after the requirements took effect.  It was 
this point that caused the divergence in opinion over whether or not PRWORA would be an 
effective reform of welfare.  Yet, among both sides of the debate, there were expressions in 
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support of lessening the federal government’s role.  Melloan writes in the Wall Street Journal 
that “It is another step toward the devolution of federal power over social services.  That process 
is already underway in response to popular demand” (July 29, 1996). 
 A New York Times editorial calling PRWORA “atrocious” nevertheless still suggests that, 
“There is also nothing inherently wrong with a bill that wants states to take more control over 
welfare–to–work programs an impose time limits on cash assistance” (August 1, 1996).  
Statements lamenting this devolution were limited.  Yet they generally bemoaned the 
dismantling of the New Deal created safety net.  Mary McGrory writes, “The tie that bound the 
central government to the pauper in the ghetto has been cut” (Washington Post, August 1, 1996). 
 Even those in favor of PRWORA have presented federal devolution as an unstoppable 
process, already well underway at the public’s behest.  Those opposed to the bill think that state 
control could be the reform that is needed, as evidenced by the pre–PRWORA success of 
Wisconsin’s welfare reform effort.  Statements to this effect, combined with the presentation of 
welfare programs as the cause of our modern social problems, lends credence to the public 
perception of the federal government as a bureaucratic morass, incompetent and even harmful.  
Just as President Clinton signed the bill into law despite having serious reservations about some 
of its provisions, even its opponents spoke of the necessity of a quick and fundamental change to 
the system. 
Analysis 
 As in the 1964 sample, there was a lack of any consensus in 1996 on not only whether or 
not the passing of PRWORA was wise, but what the consequences would be for the nation.  It 
would either throw one million more children into poverty or provide “hope for poor Americans” 
(Joseph I. Lieberman, New York Times, July 25, 1996).  As in the earlier editorials, it was the 
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common assumptions, and the extent to which they were stressed and repeated, that were most 
evocative and influential in shaping public discourse and opinion on the problems of welfare and 
poverty in the United States.  Though the editorials in this sample were ostensibly about the 
ability of PRWORA to adequately “reform” welfare, what stood out from the writings on both 
sides of the debate was the nearly universal agreement that the current system in place, and the 
growth it underwent beginning in 1964, was a cause of the severe rise of social problems such as 
crime or out–of–wedlock childbirth over the intervening thirty-two years and was therefore in 
desperate need of change. 
 The strength of the language the writers used, and the harshness of their condemnation of 
AFDC, described a situation to the reader that seemed to call for an immediate revamping of the 
federal welfare state.  Franklin D. Roosevelt, in speaking about his first New Deal programs that 
laid the groundwork for AFDC, said: “It is common sense to take a method and try it.  If it fails, 
admit it frankly and try another.  But above all, try something.”  In seeking to dismantle these 
same programs, writers implicitly invoked this philosophy by describing what they saw as the 
horrors of welfare in such certain terms that readers would not hesitate to admit that any change 
was a positive change and should be tried immediately.  Even if reform failed, its failure could 
not worsen an already deplorable situation.   
 Invoking his family’s own personal experiences with the welfare system to justify his 
position, Robert C. Waterbury describes the situation of his granddaughter and her mother who 
is, with four children, “married to our federally sponsored welfare system.”  He believes this 
system has cared for her better than his son could.  She enjoys public housing, cash, food stamps, 
as well as health and dental care that would be lost to her were she to marry his son, ending the 
“illegitimacy” of her children.  Mr. Waterbury sees the “fatherless children scuffling about” the 
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housing project and “fear[s] the effects of a childhood without the guidance, support, and 
strength of a father’s consistent presence” (Wall Street Journal, August 8, 1996).  This anecdotal 
tale of woe by a concerned grandfather is explicitly aimed at invoking the sympathy of the reader 
for the children who are the innocent victims of a failed federal welfare system.  The “culture of 
dependency,” Waterbury claims, could even affect your family as it did his, making reform 
something that suddenly every hard–working American should be concerned with. 
 More strong words on the problems with AFDC and other welfare programs such as 
public housing come from Democratic Senator Joseph Lieberman.  He writes: “[Welfare] makes 
it possible for a young woman (too often a teen–age girl) to have a child, move away from home, 
get an apartment, and survive — without working” (New York Times, July 25, 1996).  His 
position as a well–known politician gives his opinion particular heft in an atmosphere with so 
many voices competing for the public’s attention and agreement.  Likewise, a promise from the 
governor of Massachusetts that “states won’t be cruel” (William Weld, New York Times, 
February 9, 1996) if given control over their own welfare programs, or from Bill Bennett that 
“things have to change if we are to avoid social ruin” (Washington Post, August 18, 1996) are 
particularly effective in shaping the reality of welfare and its consequences for the reader.  These 
are the voices of men in power, and with ostensibly more knowledge about these issues than the 
average reader.  Simply having their names and qualifications in the byline adds legitimacy, and 
therefore influence, to their words. 
 Newspaper editorials in the months preceding PRWORA’s passage continued the job 
begun in the 1960s of convincing the public of the individual nature of poverty. The dominant 
view was not of a poverty caused by globalization, off–shoring, or shifting fiscal policy, but 
rather of poverty due to the personal moral and ethical failure of those who found themselves 
 72
dependent on an irresponsible welfare system that encouraged these behaviors.  Of the fifty-four 
texts in the 1996 sample, less than ten percent even mentioned economic or market forces as the 
primary cause of modern poverty, and most of these were in a single source, the New York 
Times.  Regular readers of the Washington Post or Wall Street Journal may never even have 
encountered editorial content that did not fault the welfare system for intergenerational poverty 
or the absence of a work ethic, to name some of the problems blamed on AFDC.   
 Those who read and trusted newspaper editorials to offer informed and fair views on 
PRWORA were left with a singular opinion — the federally controlled welfare system of the 
prior sixty-one years was an abject failure that had come to cause the problems that it was 
established to solve.  Swift and fundamental change was imperative. 
  
  
 73
Conclusion 
 
 In their study on media images of the poor in the post welfare reform era, Bullock, 
Wyche, and Williams write: 
In their many forms, media have the potential to educate, raise consciousness, and shape 
public attitudes (Kinder, 1998).  This power to influence our beliefs may be particularly 
strong when highly politicized issues, such as affirmative action, the death penalty, or 
public assistance, are considered.  Readers or viewers may be limited in their ability to 
evaluate the accuracy of the stories they read or the images they view without direct 
personal experience or specific background knowledge of an issue (2001:229–230). 
 
This is especially true of newspaper editorials which, by their nature, seek to influence, not 
inform.  The authors continue: “It seems likely that the dominant, destructive images of the 
1980’s and early 1990’s contributed to public support for welfare ‘reform’ particularly among 
middle–class European Americans” (2001:237).   
 In this thesis, I extended this idea, theorizing that the influence of editorials played a role 
in the public’s support for the passage of the two most fundamental changes to welfare policy 
since the New Deal.  The way that these issues were framed by the editorials ignored the 
substantive issues surrounding and influencing the proposed government policies, including the 
economy, in favor of simplistic individualistic explanations for poverty and welfare dependence 
that encouraged support for the EOA and PRWORA.  Such policies allowed for the blaming of 
the poor for their own problems and allowed the federal government to escape blame for past and 
future failure. 
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 The 1964 discourse offered two opposing conceptions of the present problem.  There was 
either too much poverty in the United States or there was too much talk of poverty in the United 
States when little to none actually existed.  Whether or not the writers supported the EOA based 
upon their perception of the problem, they located the solution in both assistance to individuals 
to overcome their personal deficiency in skill or education as well as liberal government fiscal 
policy that encouraged capital growth.  Of course, this all hinged on the assumption that the 
present rate of economic growth and job creation would continue indefinitely.   
 There was little discussion of changing the terms of cash benefit programs, which were 
assumed to become essentially obsolete once full (or near full) employment was reached thanks 
to a combination of both the EOA’s new training programs and the anticipated job growth.  The 
1964 editorials were still impressing upon their readers that the post World War II economic 
boom was not part of a cycle of ups and downs but evidence of the potential for and likelihood of 
unlimited future growth. 
 Consequently, those who remained poor after these training programs were initiated and 
jobs were made available could be seen as unwilling to work themselves out of poverty and thus 
deserving of it.  Newspaper editorials in the months before the passage of the EOA shaped the 
public perception of poverty as a problem simply of lack of education and training.  If the 
proposed programs failed to reduce poverty, Americans could commence blaming the poor who 
failed to take advantage of the opportunities they were given.  In suggesting that better education 
and job training, under the guise of EOA programs like the Job Corps, was the panacea for 
poverty, these writers contributed to the shaping of what became the dominant public belief — 
that poverty represents the individual’s moral failure to subscribe to the values of hard work and 
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sacrifice.  Despite a changing economic landscape and diminished job availability, this belief 
persisted through the 1990s. 
 By the time PRWORA was introduced, with 13.7 percent of Americans still in poverty, 
the conventional wisdom stated that the poor were lazy, unwilling to work, and suffering due to 
their rejection of mainstream American values.  While the idea was certainly not new (see 
Murray 1984), it is presented in many of the sample editorials as a foregone conclusion that the 
federal welfare system is no longer a source of poverty relief but rather the cause of behaviors 
that keep people in poverty.  Even those who opposed PRWORA agreed that welfare reform of 
some type was necessary.  Despite quibbling over the specifics of the bill — namely, its lack of 
provision for funds, training, and jobs for former AFDC recipients — the editorial writers were 
nearly unanimous in their condemnation of welfare as a failed system that incentivized the poor 
to behave in ways that are personally and socially destructive.  Consequently, their readership is 
left with the only logical conclusion, that the dismantling of the welfare state is vital to ending 
entrenched poverty and welfare dependence, ensuring their support of PROWRA. 
 The editorials, in their demonization of the current welfare system, also perpetuated the 
idea that addressing poverty means addressing the deficiencies of the individual.  While this 
meant, in 1964, providing increased training and education, by 1996 it meant ending government 
assistance in order to spur recipients to take “personal responsibility” for their situations.  There 
is a marked lack of recognition of the structural barriers to ending poverty.  Likewise, there is no 
mention of the fact that these barriers did not arise in a vacuum but were the result of intentional 
government decisions throughout the 1970s and 1980s. 
 The editorials in the 1964 sample — whether due to willfull ignorance or simply naïve 
optimism — created a reality for readers in which well–paying Fordist jobs were readily 
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available to all (regardless of race or sex) and their numbers would continue to grow with the 
government’s support of capital accumulation and provision of corporate welfare in addition to 
public welfare.  They imagined a scenario that allowed for only one possible outcome — the 
eventual blame of those who failed to get out of poverty due to their own laziness and 
unwillingness to work. 
 In the years between the EOA and PRWORA debates, the formulated reality of the 1964 
editorials became abjectly unreal.  The 1970s brought a stagnant economy, the oil crisis, 
inflation, and the beginning of the end for the manufacturing sector in the United States.  When 
the welfare system that was in place failed to reduce poverty and suffering in the face of these 
new challenges, it opened the door for the ideological assault of conservative academic literature 
(and a media that mimicked its talking points) contributing to the mainstreaming of the anti 
welfare arguments that grew in popularity in the 1980s.   
 The introduction of PRWORA could have steered the discourse towards a discussion of 
these economic changes and government policy decisions, and what they meant for the poor and 
unskilled.  However, editorials instead focused on the failure of welfare programs to move 
people out of poverty, and insisted on their complete overhaul.  They continued the job, begun in 
the 1970s, of convincing the public that it was individuals who failed under the current system to 
move themselves into the mainstream economy and to adopt mainstream values. 
 Though the EOA and PRWORA differed fundamentally in their approaches to poverty 
and welfare, editorials on both sides of the debates over both policies identified the problem, the 
responsible parties, and the potential solutions in strikingly similar ways.  By conceiving the 
problem of poverty as individual in nature — that is, as a result of the individual’s deficiency in 
training, education, values, or work ethic as opposed to having a structural cause — these 
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editorials primed the public to support policies that reinforced this belief, even if only implicitly.  
The Economic Opportunity Act of 1964 aimed not to address the institutional forces like racism 
that President Johnson recognized, but rather to better prepare the individual to overcome these 
barriers through education.   
 Because this approach — grounded as it was in an economic milieu that no longer existed 
— did not result in fewer poor, the perception of the poor as lacking a work ethic thrived and 
grew over the intervening decades.  By the time of the Personal Responsibility and Work 
Opportunity Act of 1996, editorials needed only to reinforce the sentiment that had been growing 
among the public.  It came to be believed that the welfare system that was meant to solve the 
problem of poverty had only worsened it by stifling the ability of the poor to take responsibility 
for themselves by voluntarily entering the low wage workforce. 
 While the public’s opinion on issues of poverty and welfare are not solely the result of 
newspaper editorials, nor is the passing of any legislation solely the result of popular sentiment 
or ideology, the way that editorials (and the media in general) frame the problems they address 
impacts the public’s perception of reality and consequently the legislation and legislators that 
they support.  In this instance, increasing editorial support for explanations of poverty that placed 
accountability on individuals’ behavior and that also failed to discuss the macroeconomic forces 
that influence the poverty rate, led to public and legislative support for policies that eventually 
dismantled the federal safety net and refashioned the goal of welfare from protection of the poor 
from economic downturns to mandatory participation in the workforce and acceptance of 
“shared” mainstream values. 
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Appendix One 
 
1964 Editorials, All Sources 
 
Source Date Title Section/Page Author Column 
New York 
Times 
7/21/1964 Debate Over Poverty 32 Editorial   
New York 
Times 
6/24/1964 War on Poverty 36 Editorial   
Washington 
Post 
4/15/1964 War on Poverty: 
Headed in the Right 
Direction 
A23 Roscoe 
Drummond 
  
Washington 
Post 
3/19/1964 The War on Poverty A19 Walter 
Lippman 
Today and 
Tomorrow . 
. .  
Washington 
Post 
3/17/1964 The War on Poverty A16 Editorial   
Washington 
Post 
2/19/1964 Next Test For 
Johnson 
A17 Joseph Alsop Matter of 
Fact. . .   
Washington 
Post 
1/27/1964 To the Roots of 
Poverty 
A12 Editorial   
Wall Street 
Journal 
3/20/1964 There Is Always a 
Bottom Fifth 
16;3 William Henry 
Chamberlin 
  
Wall Street 
Journal 
3/11/1964 A Philosophy of 
Poverty 
14;1 Editorial Review 
and 
Outlook 
Wall Street 
Journal 
4/15/1964 Preserving Poverty 16;4 Harley L. Lutz   
Wall Street 
Journal 
4/3/1964 Anti–Poverty Package 10;4 Joseph 
Sullivan 
  
Wall Street 
Journal 
7/28/1964 Too Big A Target 12;1 Editorial Review 
and 
Outlook 
Wall Street 
Journal 
3/17/1964 New War, Old 
Weapons 
16;1 Editorial Review 
and 
Outlook 
Wall Street 
Journal 
8/11/1964 Individual's Role in 
Poverty Fight 
14;1 William Henry 
Chamberlin 
  
Wall Street 
Journal 
3/26/1964 Poverty Boom 14;3 Vermont 
Royster 
Thinking 
Things 
Over 
Wall Street 
Journal 
2/4/1964 Back to Bryan 16;3 Vermont 
Royster 
Thinking 
Things 
Over 
Wall Street 
Journal 
8/27/1964 A New Day of Doles 12;1 Editorial Review 
and 
Outlook 
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Appendix Two 
 
1996 Editorials, All Sources 
 
Source Date Title Section/Page Author Column 
New York 
Times 
8/25/1996 The 'Nonworking 
Class' 
4, 12,  Editorial Desk   
New York 
Times 
8/24/1996 Welfare's Drug 
Connection 
1, 23 Joseph Califano, 
Jr. 
  
New York 
Times 
8/5/1996 Welfare Hysteria A, 17 Bob Herbert In America 
New York 
Times 
8/2/1996 Throw Them Out A, 27 Bob Herbert In America 
New York 
Times 
8/1/1996 A Sad Day for Poor 
Children 
A, 26 Editorial Desk   
New York 
Times 
7/25/1996 Mr. Clinton's Duty on 
Welfare 
A, 22 Editorial Desk   
New York 
Times 
7/25/1996 Welfare as We Know It A, 23 Joseph I. 
Lieberman 
  
New York 
Times 
7/22/1996 Welfare Reform in 
Name Only 
A,19 David T. Ellwood   
New York 
Times 
7/22/1996 The Mouths of Babes A, 19 Bob Herbert In America 
New York 
Times 
6/1/1996 Who Stands for 
Children? 
1, 18 Editorial Desk   
New York 
Times 
5/28/1996 Wisconsin Shuffle A, 17 Paul Offner   
New York 
Times 
5/7/1996 Wisconsin's Welfare 
Boomerang 
A, 23 Harriet Brown   
New York 
Times 
5/3/1996 Wisconsin's Bold, 
Risky Welfare Plan 
A, 30 Editorial Desk   
New York 
Times 
2/23/1996 Wanted: Jobs of Last 
Resort 
A, 31 Sheldon Danziger 
and Peter 
Gottschalk 
  
New York 
Times 
2/9/1996 The States Won't Be 
Cruel 
A, 29 William Weld   
New York 
Times 
2/2/1996 The Republican 
Welfare Trap 
4, 12 Editorial Desk   
Washington 
Post 
8/29/1996 Whom Do You Trust? A22 Editorial   
Washington 
Post 
8/23/1996 It Won't Wash, Mr. 
President 
A20 Editorial   
Washington 
Post 
8/19/1996 Where Welfare 
Recipients Can Find 
Work 
A15 William 
Raspberry 
  
Washington 
Post 
8/18/1996 A Welfare Test C07 William J. Bennet   
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Washington 
Post 
8/8/1996 Worse Than Welfare 
As We Know It? 
A31 William 
Raspberry 
  
Washington 
Post 
8/5/1996 In The Wake of a 
Bogus Bill 
A19 E.J. Dionne, Jr.   
Washington 
Post 
8/4/1996 When Principle Is At 
Issue 
C07 Daniel P. 
Moynihan 
  
Washington 
Post 
8/1/1996 The Welfare Decision A22 Editorial   
Washington 
Post 
8/1/1996 The Unkindest Cut of 
All 
A02 Mary McGrory   
Washington 
Post 
7/31/1996 For Better Or Worse? A27 Robert J. 
Samuelson 
  
Washington 
Post 
7/27/1996 Trashed by the Welfare 
Bill 
A23 Colbert I. King   
Washington 
Post 
7/26/1996 For the Record A26 Editorial   
Washington 
Post 
7/26/1996 A Million More Poor 
Children 
A27 Isabel Sawhill, 
Sheila Zedlewski 
  
Washington 
Post 
7/25/1996 A Children's Veto A28 Editorial   
Washington 
Post 
7/25/1996 Unlearned Lessons 
About Welfare 
A29 Paul Offner   
Washington 
Post 
7/23/1996 The Right Vote on the 
Welfare Bill 
A16 Editorial   
Washington 
Post 
7/23/1996 Clinton's Choice A17 E.J. Dionne, Jr.   
Washington 
Post 
7/21/1996 At Least Save Food 
Stamps 
C06 Editorial   
Washington 
Post 
7/18/1996 A Bad Welfare Bill A26 Editorial   
Washington 
Post 
7/15/1996 Welfare Reform, 
Wisconsin Style 
A19 William 
Raspberry 
  
Washington 
Post 
7/9/1996 Adopt the Wisconsin 
Plan 
A15 Mickey Kaus   
Washington 
Post 
7/4/1996 ‘Wisconsin Works': 
Breaking a Covenant 
A29 Rembert G. 
Weakland 
  
Washington 
Post 
6/23/1996 Welfare Squeeze C06 Editorial   
Washington 
Post 
6/9/1996 Welfare Gymnastics C06 Editorial   
Washington 
Post 
6/4/1996 Minding the Children A02 Mary McGrory   
Washington 
Post 
5/21/1996 The Welfare Trap A18 Editorial   
Washington 
Post 
2/10/1996 Maryland's Welfare 
Reform 
A22 Editorial   
Washington 
Post 
2/6/1996 Let's Talk Welfare A15 James K. 
Glassman 
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Washington 
Post 
2/4/1996 Welfare: 'This Fight Is 
Not Over' 
C07 E. Clay Shaw, Jr.   
Washington 
Post 
2/3/1996 Mr. Clinton's Welfare 
Moves 
A18 Editorial   
Washington 
Post 
1/17/1996 Welfare Leadership A16 Editorial   
Washington 
Post 
1/11/1996 Close Call A23 Daniel P. 
Moynihan 
  
Wall Street 
Journal 
8/9/1996 Uncle Sam Is A Poor 
Stepfather 
A, 10 Robert C. 
Waterbury 
  
Wall Street 
Journal 
8/1/1996 It's Over A, 14 Editorial Review 
and 
Outlook 
Wall Street 
Journal 
8/1/1996 Mr. Clinton Keeps His 
Welfare Promise 
A, 14 Will Marshall   
Wall Street 
Journal 
7/29/1996 The Welfare State is 
Being Altered, Not 
Scrapped 
A, 13 George Melloan Global 
View 
Wall Street 
Journal 
7/2/1996 White House to 
Welfare Reformers: 
Drop Dead 
A, 14 Mark Neilsen   
Wall Street 
Journal 
2/28/1996 Welfare: An Albatross 
for Young Mothers 
A, 14 Douglas 
Besharov 
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